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I. INTRODUCTION

Hong Kong is widely believed to epitomize the practical virtues of the
neoclassical economic model. It consistently outranks other countries in
terms of the criteria incorporated into the Heritage Foundation's authoritative
Index of Economic Freedom. The periodically challenging and potentially
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tumultuous transition from British to Chinese rule has thus far had no
tangible impact on its status in this respect. A new post-1997 political
configuration, coupled with a series of exogenous shocks (the late
twentieth century Asian financial crisis, the 2001-2002 global stock
market rout, and environmental hazards such as bird flu and severe acute
respiratory syndrome/SARS), and intensifying domestic pressures for
greater government involvement in the economy, have inevitably left
their imprint on the public policy constellation, but the structural
characteristics and operational features of the system have undergone
marginal rather than fundamental changes.
A distinction needs to be drawn between the ideal Hong Kong
represents and economic realities in the territory. The latter have always
deviated from the former (a cluster of stylized facts) and the gap may
have grown larger over time in response to forces triggered in the course
of modernization (notably, affluence, globalization, social complexity,
and technological transformation and communications revolution). The
balance between the public and private sector has thus not been entirely
static, reflecting a secular trend toward mild government expansion and
occasionally cyclical, or rather countercyclical, flurry of public policy
initiatives designed to stabilize a temporarily faltering economy. This
pattern may have become somewhat more pronounced following the
reversion to Chinese rule but additional factors, systematic as well as ad
hoc in nature, may have been at work.
Consequently, government spending, aimed at supporting a considerable
array of programs, cannot be dismissed as insignificant. By the same
token, public regulation of private sector activity should not be portrayed
as a peripheral phenomenon. Further, the government has not displayed
a strong interest in "rolling back the frontiers of the State" or embracing
economic liberalization, via privatization and deregulation. It may thus
be legitimately argued that the picture painted by neoclassical admirers
of this supposedly last bastion of truly unfettered capitalism does not
fully correspond to the institutional setup observed in practice and the
divergence is the product of persistent influences, albeit not necessarily
of the steady-state variety, rather than a historical aberration.
It may however be inappropriate to insist on a near perfect match
between a stylized model and the social milieu whose essence it endeavors
to capture and employ merely absolute, as distinct from comparative,
yardsticks in assessing its merits. From a relative perspective, Hong
Kong, even at this juncture, may justifiably be singled out for its
generally faithful, even if not unflinching, adherence to neoclassical
economic principles. Government spending continues to account for a
comparatively modest fraction of the gross domestic product. More often
than not, its revenue exceeds its expenditure and budget surpluses are
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deliberately targeted and carefully managed. Both fiscal and monetary
policies (particularly the latter, because of a reliance on a linkedexchange-rate-system with the U.S. dollar as its pivot) tend to be
conducted according to predetermined rules rather than in a discretionary
fashion. Public regulation is not conspicuous by its absence, but the
regime is at the "light touch" end of the control spectrum.'
The corollary is that notable departures from the neoclassical ideal
deserve careful consideration. This is particularly the case if they are
found in areas where there is substantial external exposure. The reason
lies in the fact that the desire to maintain a light touch has traditionally
manifested itself perhaps most visibly in such areas. Further, Hong
Kong has long had an unmistakable international economic orientation,
initially as an outward-looking manufacturing center (possibly even
earlier as a modest entrep6t before the outbreak of the Korean War in
1950), and subsequently as a prominent service center (following the
opening up of China in 1978). Indeed, in recent years, the territory has
evolved into a global metropolis performing intermediary-type functions
beyond the Asia-Pacific region. 2
Current and capital account transactions proceed effectively unimpeded
in Hong Kong. There are virtually no barriers to foreign trade, in both
goods and services, and investment flows-in all its forms. In fact,
capital movements are not even tracked in a comprehensive manner.
"Sin" taxes are imposed on some imported products, but this does not
amount to a quantitatively and qualitatively significant deviation from
the norm. More importantly, such selective fiscal measures with modest
external implications are generally aimed at correcting market failure
(predominantly negative externalities and asymmetric information) rather
than shielding domestic producers from foreign competition. Local
residents are taxed exclusively on income generated at home. Migratory
movements are subject to tighter restrictions, perhaps excessively so,
and this is the sole meaningful macro-level posture that does not neatly
accord with an otherwise extraordinarily liberal policy architecture.
In specific sector or industrial domains, or at the micro level,
government restraint is also noteworthy on the international economic

1. For a broader discussion of these issues, see Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat,
The Transfer of Property Rights from the Public to the Private Sector in Hong Kong: A
CriticalAssessment, 35 GLOBAL ECON. REV. 445, 445-61 (2006).

2.

This role is methodically explored in DAVID R.

GLOBAL METROPOLIS (2000).

MEYER, HONG KONG AS A

front, even if it does not always match that exhibited in the macro realm.
One intriguing exception to the rule is the aviation industry where a
degree of policy rigidity has persisted for a long period of time in that
the government has been steadfast in its reluctance to unambiguously
embrace the logic of open skies and, from a wider perspective, to
unilaterally pursue a laissez-faire agenda (in most other policy spheres, a
liberal path has consistently been followed irrespective of the stance of
actual/potential trade partners or prevailing international commercial
practices). The purpose of this Article is to provide a systematic explanation
for that seemingly counterintuitive strategic pattern and to draw appropriate
inferences regarding the functioning of international legal regimes,
particularly ones shaped by powerful economic forces. This is preceded
by a discussion of the evolution of the concept around which the paper
revolves and its application in Hong Kong.
II. TOWARD "OPEN SKIES"

The aviation industry has witnessed dramatic policy and structural
shifts since the Great Depression of the 1930's. The directional swings
observed and their repercussions have arguably exceeded those seen in
other segments of the transportation sector and, with some notable
exceptions, possibly elsewhere in the economic space. The United States
has exercised strategic initiative on that front, shedding at critical historical
junctures established regulatory frameworks and opting for new ones.
Given its quasi-hegemonic status during the period in question, and the
global nature of the aviation industry, innovative American institutional
practices have spread throughout the industrialized world and beyond,
albeit not necessarily without encountering any resistance or in a
coordinated fashion. Regime adaptation, while not entirely smooth, has
thus been an international phenomenon.
Airline regulation is a multidimensional undertaking. From an economic
perspective, the two key facets pertain to market entry and exit-price
controls and rate regulation are equally salient but merit less attention in
this context. The former occurs when an existing airline institutes a
service in a market or a combination of markets along a route; it may
also take place following an entry into the airline business by a brand
new enterprise, an increasingly common pattern in recent years. The
latter is a product of service discontinuation in a market by an airline; it
may be the result of an independent corporate decision or government
intervention. Complex economic considerations drive movement in both
directions, although profitability is the principal element in the equation.
Socio-political factors feature prominently as well, particularly on the
government side.
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The pre-Great Depression or, to be precise, pre-1938 formal control of
market entry and exit in the United States was to all intents and purposes
nonexistent. The sole restrictions in place concerned safety matters.
However, from a practical standpoint, it was not realistically possible to
operate an airline on a profitable basis without securing a heavily
subsidized air mail contract from the Post Office Department. The
Postmaster General thus effectively exercised significant power over
market entry. Prior to 1925, the Post Office Department operated its
own fleet of aircraft to deliver air mail; the Kelly Act of 1925 led to a
dismantling of this service and the emergence of the air mail-subsidized
private airline; four carriers evolved into substantial players in the
domestic arena and one came to dominate international routes during the
1925-1938 period.3
The Great Depression precipitated an attitudinal change regarding
government intervention in the economy. The fiscal, monetary, and
regulatory authorities adopted a more decisive stance and expanded their
institutional capabilities in its wake. In 1938, pursuant to the Civil
Aeronautics Act promulgated in that year, the economic side of airline
operations was placed under the control of the federal government in a
manner reflecting structural and functional principles followed elsewhere in
the transportation sector (e.g., the regulation of surface carriers by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)) and other industries (e.g., the
control of public utilities such as electricity-generating companies by
State public utility commissions). The agency formed to oversee the
economic regulation of airlines was the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB). 4
The 1938 legislation rendered it illegal to operate a common carrier
airline service without obtaining a "certificate of public convenience and
necessity" from the CAB. The board also had to determine the airline
was "fit, willing, and able" to provide the service and comply with the
3. See WILLIAM E. O'CONNOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE ECONOMICS 24-25
(6th ed. 2001). For additional insights, see ELIZABETH E. BAILEY, DAVID R. GRAHAM &
DANIEL P. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985); STEVEN MORRISON &
CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1986); PAUL
STEPHEN DEMPSEY & ANDREW R. GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE
MYTHOLOGY (1992); Richard H.K. Vietor, Contrived Competition: Airline Regulation
and Deregulation, 1925-1998, in BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1870
345-392 (Robert F. Hinmelberg ed., 1994).
4. See O'CONNOR, supra note 3, at 1-2. For additional insights, see BAILEY,
GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY &
GOETZ, supra note 3; Victor, supranote 3.

Civil Aeronautics Act and the board's own specific functional criteria,
commonly referred to as the "fitness requirements." The certification
procedure was not necessarily onerous, but it could not be portrayed as
liberal either. The CAB practices, as well as the spirit and letter of the
underlying legislation, were not strongly geared toward the encouragement
of entry into air transportation markets and the fostering of healthy
competition. Rather, a fine balance was sought between the conflicting
values pertaining to industry structure and performance. The 1958
Federal Aviation Act left these legislative and policy features largely
intact. 5
The control of market exit was also tangibly tightened in response to
the concerns triggered by the turmoil of the Great Depression and
subsequent paradigm shift in economic theory and its application. After
1938, a certified airline needed to secure CAB authorization to suspend
operations in any market on its certificate. This configuration was
underpinned by strategic logic reflecting seemingly broad public interest
imperatives, as distinct from purely commercial ones. To state it
differently, an airline was expected to furnish service rather than merely
maximize profits. Flying in commercially unviable market niches in
return for being granted a protected franchise to operate in profitable
segments was viewed as part of the bargain. In that vein, proceedings to
discontinue service often led to public hearings which community
representatives endeavored to employ as a vehicle for maintaining the
status quo.6
The Keynesian foundations of the post-Great Depression economic
order proved more fragile than anticipated. Widespread manifestations
of macro- and micro-level government failure-culminating in a painful
stagflationary episode that stretched over an entire decade of the
1970's-have resulted in another paradigm shift, toward the libertarian end
of the policy and ideological spectrum. As events unfolded in that
direction, CAB decisions began to follow a less restrictive path, displaying a
not previously apparent willingness to accommodate commercially
driven demand for market entry and exit, as well as allowing airlines to
exercise a higher degree of discretion regarding rates. Such informal

5.
See O'CONNOR, supra note 3, at 24-39. For additional insights, see BAILEY,
GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY &
GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3.

6.

See O'CONNOR, supra note 3, at 39.

For additional insights, see BAILEY,

GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY &

GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3.
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practices have assumed an unambiguously authoritative form following
the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.'
Although its name may suggest otherwise, this landmark piece of
legislation did not eliminate post-Great Depression era economic control
mechanisms over the aviation industry in one sweep. Rather, deregulatory
measures were implemented in a stepwise fashion. In 1981, control over
domestic entry and exit effectively ceased. Control over domestic
commercial cargo was removed somewhat earlier and control over
passenger fares was terminated a year later. By late 1984, the CAB
itself was dismantled and its remaining functions were transferred to the
Department of Transportation (DOT). Perhaps the most economically
significant among those which survived the institutional revamping was
the authority over foreign air services-from and to the United States, by
both American and foreign airlines-now wielded by the DOT. 8
Initially, the systematic loosening of government grip over the aviation
industry was largely confined to the United States. Other countries were
generally reluctant to embrace the underlying philosophical premises
and emulate the new practices. The trend toward rolling back the
frontiers of the State however evolved before long into an Anglo-Saxon
phenomenon, spreading subsequently to Western Europe, and eventually
assuming effectively global dimensions. By the mid-1990's, the deregulation
of air transportation services reached an advanced stage in terms of its
geographic breadth as well as its functional depth, although the process
of decontrol had not been entirely smooth and some resistance to the
liberal impulses originating from countries firmly committed to
shrinking government tentacles has continued to surface periodically (at
times requiring the superior bargaining power of the United States to
neutralize it, or at least to blunt its sharp edges). 9
The geographic unevenness of support for deregulation-originally
epitomized by the liberal posture of a handful of countries led by the
United States and the reticence displayed by most others-has been
7.

See O'CONNOR, supra note 3, at 2-3. For additional insights, see BAILEY,
& KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY &
GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3.
GRAHAM,

8.

See O'CONNOR, supra note 3, at 2-3.

For additional insights, see BAILEY,

GRAHAM, & KAPLAN, supra note 3; MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 3; DEMPSEY &

GOETZ, supra note 3; Vietor, supra note 3.
9. See O'CONNOR, supra note 3, at 3.

For additional insights, see GEORGE

WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION (1993); GEORGE
WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S MIXED LEGACY (2002).

particularly apparent on the international front. The Paris Convention of
1919 enshrined the principle of States' right to exercise sovereignty in
the air space over their territory and this has crystallized into one of the
three key tenets underpinning air law, the other two being the principles
of aircraft nationality-whereby an aircraft must bear the nationality of
the State in which it is registered-and cabotage-which grants States
full authority with respect to foreign aviation activity undertaken in their
airspace, including0 the power to restrict a foreign aircraft from landing at
any of its airports.'
The notion of "absolute and unlimited sovereignty" faced competitive
challenges at the turn of the twentieth century. Some legal scholars and
practitioners adopted Grotius' high seas argument and highlighted the
merits of a complete freedom of air space. Others sought practical ways,
reflecting prevailing technological capabilities, to limit State jurisdiction, to
one thousand feet above its territory, without significantly diluting it. A
third group followed a conceptually similar but somewhat less flexible
tack by aiming at a compromise formula that would consider the entire
air space over a country as national domain, coupled however, with an
acceptance of the right of innocent passage through it. The public good
attributes of air space (i.e., lack of natural, physical boundaries) and military
concerns, which were rife in the period preceding the First World War,
eventually tipped the balance in favor of the idea of absolute and unlimited
sovereignty, given authoritative expression in the Paris Convention."
As a corollary, States have subsequently enjoyed complete and
unfettered control over their air space, being unencumbered by external
constraints and exercising wide discretion in regulating air traffic flows
within their borders. National air space has thus been "de jure closed for
foreign aircraft and their operators."' 12 At the policy management level,
individual governments, through the implementation of national laws,
have been exclusively responsible for controlling market entry, exit,
competition, prices, airport operations, pace of growth, and reach of the
aviation industry. Regulation has for all intents and purposes been a
domestic enterprise lacking a salient international dimension.' 3 This is
not to imply national laws are the sole source of air law; also included in
10. See Alexander Parets, Freedom of the Skies: International Law and the
Aviation Industry, 5 GLOBAL ToPics E-JOURNAL, Article #2007-3, 4-5 (2007), http://
www.anselm.edu/nhiop/research/arc/intaffairs/global+topics/archive/2007+Global+Topi
cs.htm. For a broader overview, which remains effective today, see BIN CHENG, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1962).

11.
12.

See Parets, surpa note 10, at 2-3.
Pablo Mendes de Leon, The Dynamics of Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in

InternationalAviation Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

483, 484 (Gerald Kreijen ed., 2002).
13.

See ANTHONY E. BROWN, THE POLITICS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 45 (1987).
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this category are multilateral agreements, bilateral agreements, contracts
between air carriers and other entities, and general principles of international
law. 14

The doctrine of absolute and unlimited sovereignty both acknowledged and
reinforced the status of a country's air space as a highly valuable natural
resource. One of its practical upshots was an erosion of support for a
potentially laissez-faire approach to international aviation, broadly rooted in
pre-twentieth century economic attitudes and conduct, and the emergence of
a loose pattern of bilateral agreements between countries possessing
airlines, whether privately or publicly owned, and countries to or through
which those airlines sought to fly. While this configuration reflected strong
domestic/national interests, and was solidly underpinned in the conceptual/
legal sense of the term, ad hoc bilateralism imposed considerable costs on
the parties involved and its adverse consequences became increasingly
obvious in the period leading up to the Second World War. 5
The representatives of fifty-two States who met in Chicago in 1944 to
address the issue, and whose efforts culminated in the signing of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, commonly referred to as the
Chicago Convention, were aware of the limitations of the existing
arrangements regarding the exchange of traffic rights, or "freedoms of
the air"-as well as the control of fares, freight tariffs, flight frequencies,
and capacity-and the need to design a more effective governance
framework. Competitive imbalances, stemming from differences in the
economic burden carried in confronting the Axis powers and market
structure, nevertheless impeded progress toward that goal. The United
States, whose aviation industry was expected to emerge in far better
shape following the termination of military hostilities than those of its
allies, favored a shift toward a maximum exchange of traffic rights-as
well as the elimination of other relevant restrictions-and it's open skies
strategy was supported by countries with a small home base-such as
the Netherlands and Sweden. By contrast, nations seriously enfeebled
by the war-such as
the United Kingdom and France-took a distinctly
6
less liberal stance.'
The Chicago conference participants did make palpable headway on
14.

See Parets, supra note 10, at 3. For additional insights, see

15.

See RIGAS DOGANIS, FLYING OFF COURSE: THE EcONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL

CHENG,

supra note

10.
AIRLINES 30-31 (3rd ed., 2002).
16. See id.

several fronts and, in fact, may be credited with laying the foundation for
the orderly and safe development of international air transportation.
They failed however, inter alia, to reach an agreement on the mutual
exchange of commercial traffic rights (the Third and Fourth Freedoms,
which allow the mutual exchange of traffic rights between two countries,
enabling their respective airlines to carry passengers and freight between
their territories; and the Fifth Freedom, which entails a right granted by
country A to an airline(s) from country B to carry traffic between A and
countries other than B). From the mid-1940's onward, each country has
thus negotiated a series of bilateral agreements with trading partnersknown as "bilaterals"-anchored in the new "multi lateral" order, whose
purpose has been to regulate two-way air transportation services,
primarily market entry and related matters such as points to be 7served
and traffic rights, and secondarily flight frequencies and capacity.'
A bilateral typically consists of a wide range of Articles elaborately
addressing a host of strategic and operational matters, with the economic
dimension accorded particular prominence. The heart of these agreements
has consistently featured the notion of reciprocity, denoting a fair and
equal exchange of rights between countries very different in size and
with airlines of different strengths. This has traditionally been encapsulated
in an Article containing the words, "[t]here shall be fair and equal
opportunity for the airlines of both Contracting Parties to operate the agreed8
service on the specified routes between their respective territories."'1
Nevertheless, reciprocity should not be invariably equated with liberalism
as during the early phases of the evolution of the post-Chicago
Convention
9
regime, bilaterals often displayed a protectionist bias.'
Bermuda-style accords, mirroring the air services agreement signed in
1946 by the United Kingdom and the United States in the British
overseas territory, were a notable exception to the restrictive norm.
They exhibited considerable flexibility regarding Fifth Freedom rights,
subject to certain constraints, usually linking their exercise to the end-toend traffic potential of the routes, and their accommodative characteristics
manifested themselves in other areas (e.g., with respect to frequency or
capacity on the routes and tariffs), albeit not necessarily in an openended fashion (e.g., provisions were incorporated to allow a subsequent
review of arrangements relating to frequency or capacity, in the event
the interests of an airline were more adversely affected than initially
assumed). Bermuda-style bilaterals gained increasing currency as the
pace of economic globalization accelerated and gradually superseded the
17.
18.
19.

See id.at 31-32.
Id.at 33.
See id.
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less liberal accords of the traditional variety in the industrialized world,
as illustrated in Table 1.20
TABLE 1
KEY FEATURES OF TRADITIONAL AND
BERMUDA-STYLE BILATERALS
TRADITIONAL

MARKET
ACCESS

BERMUDA-STYLE

Only specified and limited number of points/routes to be

operated by each airline.
Few Fifth Freedoms granted.

DESIGNATION

Several Fifth Freedoms
granted but total capacity
related to end-to-end (i.e.,
Third/Fourth Freedom)
demand on route.
Charter traffic rights not included.
Single
Generally single but some
_

CAPACITY

TARIFFS

double or multiple.

Airlines must be under substantial ownership and
effective control of nationals of designating State.
Capacity to be agreed or
No frequency or capacity
fifty-fifty split,
control but capacity
review if one airline too
adversely affected.
Inter-airline revenue pool required
(by some bilaterals).
Tariffs related to cost plus profit.
Approval of both governments needed (i.e., double approval).
Wherever possible, airlines should use IATA procedures.

Adapted from Douganis, The Airline Business in the Twenty-First Century,
op.cit., p. 21.
The domestically-generated post-1978 deregulatory impulses spilled
over into the international arena, further enhancing externally-oriented
liberalization efforts, albeit in a persistently uneven fashion from a
geographic perspective and hence inevitably with ambiguous results.

20. See id. at 33-34; RIGAS DOGANIS, THE AIRLINE BUSINESS INTHE TwENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 21-23 (2001).

The rise of consumerism in developed countries, the proliferation of
competitively-priced (by International Air Transport Association (IATA)
criteria) non-scheduled services, and the emergence of Asian airlines
operating outside the confines of the IATA tariff system-and thus able
to offer superior service standards and capture a growing share of the
trans-Pacific and parallel European market-provided the impetus for a
selective shift toward greater flexibility in managing bilateral
relationships in the rapidly restructuring aviation industry. The nonscheduled service and Asian challenges rendered 2it1 difficult to negotiate
agreements within the IATA organizational orbit.
The United States spearheaded the deregulation drive, endeavoring to
reverse an institutional pattern characterized by a propensity toward a
high degree of market concentration. It was initially supported by a
handful of small Asian and European countries-such as Singapore and
the Netherlands-but before long, a number of larger and economically
more prominent nations-such as the United Kingdom-recalibrated
their strategies in a similar manner. American negotiators employed
access to the vast U.S. market as a bargaining ploy in prodding other
countries into fine-tuning bilateral accords along increasingly liberal
lines. The revised U.S.-Netherlands 1978 air services agreement set the
trend in this respect, evolving into a model emulated in one form or
another in a variety of geographic contexts, with or without, notably in
intra-European settings, but also in intra-Asian ones, direct American
participation. The momentum produced led to an internationally meaningful,
albeit not unqualified, acceptance and spread of open market bilaterals
during the 1978-1991 period, which is summarized in Table 2.22

21, See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 22-23; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 50-51. For
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF
DEREGULATION, supra note 9; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S
MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9.
22, See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 23-30; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at. 51-60.
For additional insights, see WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF
DEREGULATION, supra note 9; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S
MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9.
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TABLE 2
KEY FEATURES OF PRE-1978 AND POST-1978
"OPEN MARKET" BILATERALS
MARKET

PRE-1978 BILATERALS
Only to points specified

ACCESS

Unlimited Fifth Freedoms
granted-more in US
bilaterals

Charter rights not included

DESIGNATION

CAPACITY

TARIFFS

POST- 1978 BILATERALS
Open access-airlines can
fly between any two
points
Extensive Fifth-Freedom
rights granted in US
bilaterals but still very
limited in intraEuropean bilaterals
Unlimited charter rights
granted (in Europe
granted earlier under
1956 ECAC agreement)

Single-some multiple in
Multiple
US bilaterals
I
Airlines must be "substantially owned and effectively
controlled" by nationals of designating State.
Single
Generally single but
some double or multiple.
Airlines must be under substantial ownership and
effective control of nationals of designating State.
Capacity to be agreed or
No frequency or
50:50
capacity controls
No capacity/frequency controls in liberal bilaterals, but
subject to review.
Double disapproval (i.e., only both governments can
block).
To be agreed using IATA country-of-rules origin rules
Procedures (in some US bilaterals).

Adapted from Doganis, Flying Off-Course: The Economics of International
Airlines, op.cit., p. 58.

The new constellation represented a marked shift toward a less
restrictive and more competitive environment for international airlines.
The open-market architecture, although incomplete, nevertheless continued
to encounter considerable headwinds and was by no means universally
embraced. By the early 1990's, the markets for scheduled air transport
from and to the United States and Canada were significantly liberalized.
Entry posed few problems because of multiple designation and capacity
or frequency constraints effectively vanished; the closely regulated
tariffs negotiated through IATA channels gave way to a less rigid system
of fare zones, with airlines enjoying wide latitude to set their fares
anywhere within the relevant agreed zones for each fare type; and
measures to control and standardize service were withdrawn. Progress
on trans-Pacific routes was substantial but somewhat more modest and
the picture within Europe varied from the relatively liberal (e.g.,
Netherlands, United Kingdom) to the relatively restrictive (e.g., Austria,
Greece) ends of the policy spectrum.
Beyond this geographic core,
23
liberalization made limited headway.
At that juncture, pressures against bilateralism, even of the enlightened
variety, began to intensify. Expert opinion, reinforced by converging
political interests, swung in favor of the view that the aviation industry
should be normalized, or allowed to function on terms similar to its
major international counterparts, rather than as a quasi-public utility.
The rigidities inherent in bilateralism, again even if sophisticated in
nature, also increasingly came to be perceived as costly impediments to
potentially beneficial exchanges in the global economic arena. Last but
not least, there was a growing recognition that the aviation industry
matured greatly since the deregulation process started in earnest. It was
thus fundamentally more resilient than at any point in the past and
capable of facing new challenges. These themes were given prominence
in the 1992 24International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Montreal
Colloquium.
Consistent with the pattern observed throughout the liberalization era,
the United States was at the forefront of efforts to translate a crystallizing
theoretical consensus into concrete action, paving the way for the emergence
of the post-1992 open skies regime. New dynamic airlines-such as
American, Delta, and United-gained a foothold in the domestic market,
displaying effectiveness no longer exhibited by their established

23. See sources cited supra note 22.
24. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 30-31; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 60-61. For
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF
DEREGULATION, supra note 9; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S
MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9.
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predecessors-such as Pan American and Trans World Airlines
(TWA)-and they were eager to reap the advantages of economies of
scale stemming from the large size of their home market (i.e., lower unit
costs) by expanding abroad. An outward-looking strategy was also
dictated in this case by competitive constraints faced in an increasingly
saturated domestic arena. Commercial U.S. interests thus combined with
ideologically and intellectually-inspired bureaucratic ones, channeled
through the DOT and the State Department, to propel the policy machine
in a markedly more liberal direction.
The specific turning point assumed the form of the first genuine open
skies accord signed in 1992, as on similar occasions in past, by the
American and Dutch governments. KLM, the Netherlands-based airline
and national carrier of the country, did not need to be subtly maneuvered
into entering into the agreement as it materially benefited from the 1978
"open market" accord with the United States and was keen to boost its
market share on the lucrative routes linking Amsterdam and American
destinations. The 1992 agreement, which set the stage for a new phase of
international deregulation, retained some of the key feature of its 1978
predecessor-multiple designation of airlines, no frequency or capacity
controls, and open charter access-and incorporated new, more liberal
ones-open route access (airlines from either country can fly to any
point in the other with full traffic rights), unlimited Fifth Freedom rights,
no traffic controls unless traffic is too high or too low, airlines free to
code share or enter into other commercial accords, permitting break-of26
gauge (when an aircraft type changes at a stopping point of a direct flight).
The open skies agreements negotiated in subsequent years, and
generally modeled on the 1992 American-Dutch accord, were deemed to
be superior from an economic perspective to the open market variants
which they replaced, particularly in terms of market access and tariff
control. Notably, they provided unlimited access to any point in either
country, whereas the previous bilaterals tended to impose restrictions on
the number of points that could be served by foreign airlines in the
United States. By the same token, unlike during the 1978-1991 period,

25. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 31-32; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 61-62. For
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S MIXED
LEGACY, supra note 9.
26. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 32; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 62. For
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S MIXED
LEGACY, supra note 9.

mutual Fifth Freedom rights were granted unconditionally. Regarding
tariffs, double disapproval or the country of origin rule gave way to a
commitment to refrain from government intervention other than in
exceptional circumstances in order to minimize the scope for discriminatory
practices, maximize consumer welfare (by shielding service recipients
from excessively high or restrictive prices), and furnish airlines with a
level playing and commercially productive field (undermined in the
preceding years by government subsidies and support). Table 3 summarizes
some of the significant features. 7
TABLE 3
KEY FEATURES OF US 1978-1991 "OPEN MARKET"

AND POST-1991 "OPEN SKIES" BILATERALS

MARKET
ACCESS

DESIGNATION

CAPACITY
TARIFFS

CODE
SHARING

1978-1991 "OPEN

POST-1991 "OPEN

MARKET"

SKIES" BILATERALS

Named number of points
in each.

BILATERALS
Unlimited
State-more limited

for non-US carriers.
Generally unlimited Fifth Unlimited Fifth
Freedom
Freedom
Domestic cabotage not allowed.
Seventh Freedom not granted.
Open Charter access.
Multiple
Substantial ownership
and effective control by
nationals of designating
State.
No frequency or capacity control.
Double disapproval or country-of-Free pricing
origin rules.
Not part of bilateral.
Code sharing
permitted.

Adapted from Doganis, The Airline Business in the Twenty-First Century,

op.cit., p. 37; Doganis, Flying Off-Course: The Economics of International
Airlines, op.cit., p. 65.

27. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 36-37; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 65-66. For
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S MIXED
LEGACY, supra note 9.
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The latest American deregulatory initiative provoked an even more
determined response on the other side of the Atlantic. While the United
States pursued liberalization within a bilateral context, the European
Union (E.U.), known until 1993 as the European Community, appropriately
went a step further and embraced multilateralism within its confines.
Two non-members, Iceland and Norway, also effectively joined the scheme.
Moreover, whereas the open skies bilaterals left the nationality rule
intact, the E.U. multilateral framework allowed cross-border majority
ownership. Because their liberalization drive assumed deeper proportions,
the Europeans deemed it essential to implement in parallel a countervailing
competition policy designed to prevent market-distorting practices
detrimental to institutional efficiency, as well as fairness and transparency,
and consumer welfare, broadly encompassing cartels and restrictive
agreements,28mergers and monopolies, and government aid or subsidies to
producers.
The open skies regime continues to evolve, though not necessarily at
a breakneck pace, and remains an unfinished enterprise, both
geographically and functionally. Many of the accords governing air
transportation between the United States and countries outside the E.U.,
and vice versa, have not progressed beyond the traditional-style pre1978 or, at best, post-1978 open market stage. The contrast between the
patterns observed within the E.U. and between the E.U. and the rest of
the world-with some exceptions, such as the United States-is particularly
glaring. Asia has not lagged significantly behind, but it is interesting to
note that few countries in this dynamic and outward-looking region have
consistently sought to fully match the policy reforms originating on both
sides of the Atlantic-New Zealand and Singapore may be singled out
as the most accommodating and favorably disposed and interested
players.2 9
28. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 38-43; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 66-69. For
additional insights, see WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S MIXED
LEGACY, supra note 9.
29. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 44-58; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 69-74. For

additional insights, see

O'CONNOR, supra note 3. WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION:
DEREGULATION'S MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9; Rauf Gonenq & Giussepe Nicoletti,

Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Air Passenger Transportation, 32
OECD ECON. STUD. 183, 183-227 (2001); Wolfgang Hubner & Pierre Sauvd,
Liberalization Scenariosfor InternationalAir Transport,35 J. WORLD TRADE 973, 973987 (2001); Jim Bergeron et al., International Transportation Law, 40 INT'L LAWYER
403, 403-15 (2006); JAGDISH N. SHETH ET AL., DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION:
LESSONS FROM THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY (2007); Jacob A. Warden, "Open Skies" at a

By the same token, even in relatively deregulated global market
segments the open skies strategy has not been pursued in a functionally
comprehensive fashion. Specifically, movement toward the exchange of
certain traffic rights has been painfully slow. Perhaps the two most prominent
examples offered in this context have been the right of an airline to carry
domestic traffic between two airports within the territory of the other
signatory country to the bilateral agreement, which constitutes an
extension of international flights within that country, referred to in
technical parlance as cabotage, and the right to carry passengers between
points in two foreign countries by an airline operating wholly outside its
home base, commonly termed the Seventh Freedom. Similar resistance
to liberalization, indeed more intense in nature,30 has been encountered
with respect to the foreign ownership of airlines.
To make matters worse, adherence to the spirit, and possibly the letter,
of the open skies regime has not been invariably strict. The United
States, the principal architect and key pillar of the system, has been
particularly prone to capitalize on substantial power asymmetries
characterizing the relationships between market participants and has at
various junctures opportunistically twisted the rules to protect American
airlines. Notwithstanding this behavior, the open skies regime has
continued to expand both quantitatively and qualitatively. The process
has not been smooth or costless from the perspective of all the parties
involved, consumers as well as producers. Nevertheless, meaningful
headway has been made and the overall gains are assumed to have
outweighed the broad disadvantages in terms of relevant economic
yardsticks. 31 Given the backdrop, it would be reasonable to expect
Crossroads: How the United States and the European Union Should Use the ECJ
Transport Cases to Reconstruct the TransatlanticAviation Regime, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 227, 227-55 (2003); Ryan Eddings, Tentative Agreement in EU-US "Open Skies"
Talks, 18 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 257, 257-71 (2006).
30. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 44-58; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 69-74. For
additional insights, see G6nen9 & Nicoletti, supra note 29; Hubner & Sauv6, supra note
29; O'CONNOR, supra note 3; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S
MIXED LEGACY, supra note 9; Bergeron et al., supra note 29; SHETH ET AL., supra note
29; Warden, supra note 29; Eddings, supra note 29.
31. See DOGANIS, supra note 20, at 19-58; G6nen9 & Nicoletti, supra note 29;
O'CONNOR, supra note 3, at 46-67; DOGANIS, supra note 15, at 48-74;
INTERVISTASCONSULTING, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE OPEN SKIES INITIATIVE:
AND FUTURE (2005), http://www.intervistas.com/4/reports/Econ%201mpact%
20ofo20Open%20Skies%2030Jun2005.pdf, Dorothy Robyn, James Reitzes & Boaz
Moselle, Beyond Open Skies: The Economic Impact of a US-EU Open Aviation Area, in
PAST

DEEP INTEGRATION: How TRANSATLANTIC MARKETS ARE LEADING GLOBALIZATION 50

(Daniel Hamilton & Joseph Quinlan eds., 2005), available at http://transatlantic.saisjhu.edu/OpenSkies.pdf, Booz ALLEN HAMILTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF AN OPEN
AVIATION AREA BETWEEN THE EU AND THE US (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/transport/
air_portal/intemational/pillars/global_partners/doc/us/eu us studyexecutivesummary.
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quintessentially market-oriented polities to unambiguously embrace the
system.
III. HONG KONG RESPONSE

Foreign trade has been the principal engine of growth driving Asian
economies throughout industrialization and, where appropriate, beyond.
For Hong Kong this has been the case during its entire history and,
because of the distinctly modest size of the domestic market, as well as
locational influences and the flexible policy framework, on a comparatively
much larger scale than witnessed in other parts of the region, with the
notable exception of Singapore. International transportation in all its forms
has been an integral component of the picture, with substantial resources
being channeled into infrastructure supporting it. Hong Kong boasts one
of the world's busiest and most sophisticated airport complexesalthough the center of gravity for shipping, a land-intensive industry, in
Southern China is gradually shifting to the mainland due to the greater
availability and lower cost of land across the border-which literally
functions as the lifeline of its widely open economy.
Up-to-date statistics regarding the state of the aviation and shipping
industries are not easy to obtain due to rapid shifts in key performance
parameters. To illustrate Hong Kong's prominence as an aviation hub, it
is possible to rely on 2006 figures showing that the territory is served by
about eighty-five airlines. Each week over 5,600 flights take place,
reaching more than 150 destinations across the globe. In 2006, the Hong
Kong International Airport (HKIA) handled approximately 44.45 million
passengers and around 3.58 million tons of air cargo. Aircraft movements in
the same year amounted to roughly 280,500. Of the 25.2 million visitors
to the territory, about 34.2% arrived by air. In value terms, the HKIA
processed approximately 37.5%, 30.3%, and 38.1%
of the territory's
32
vital exports, re-exports, and imports respectively.

pdf; IATA, Airline Liberalisation, IATA ECONOMICS BRIEFING No. 7 (2007), http://
www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/85EE6A 15-43EB-4D34-A 13E-418F404091EF/0/890000
Airline LiberalisationSummary Report.pdf. For additional insights, see Hubner &
Suave, supra note 29; WILLIAMS, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DEREGULATION'S MIXED
LEGACY, supra note 9; Bergeron et al., supra note 29; SHETH ET AL., supra note 29;
Warden, supra note 29; Eddings, supra note 29.
32. See Hong Kong Government, Airport and Aviation Services, http://www.
thb.gov.hk/eng/policy/transport/issues/air0 l.pdf (last visited on Jan. 24, 2009).

This statistical portrait reflects Hong Kong's position as a leading
service center in general and a thriving aviation hub in particular-in the
Greater China, Asian, and worldwide context, a global metropolis. The
territory has achieved this status despite constraints stemming form the
lack of sovereign power. Unlike Singapore, which has carved out a broadly
similar niche for itself in otherwise roughly similar circumstances, it
does not even qualify as a city State. Nor can close parallels be drawn
with Bahrain and Dubai, which apparently are undergoing transformation
into large-scale providers of intermediary services against the backdrop
of an economic boom underpinned by escalating oil prices. In any case,
it is premature to portray these two regional commercial centers as the
pivots of an extensive and multidimensional global network.
Lack of sovereign power has limited Hong Kong's room to maneuver
in the international arena and has at times imparted a cautious quality to
its externally-oriented policies. 33 Nevertheless, the territory has historically
exercised a substantial degree of autonomy in economic matters, both on
the domestic front and outwardly. It has thus consistently pursued a
semi-independent aviation strategy-semi-independent rather than independent
because of its position as a British colony and a Special Administrative
Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC)-and has
enjoyed even greater latitude regarding tactical and operational issues.
The strategy and its implementation have been sustained by locallyestablished financial and institutional capabilities.34
The transition from British to Chinese rule has had no concrete legal
and policy repercussions on Hong Kong's freedom of action in the
aviation domain. A high measure of continuity from the configuration
prevailing during the colonial era 35 to the potentially challenging political
constellation to emerge following the absorption into the body politic of
a nominally communist State36 has been technically secured via relevant
international (albeit strictly bilateral in nature) legal and constitutional
33. For an overview, see RODA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, Two INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE CASE OF HONG KONG (1997); Roda Mushkat, Hong Kong's
Exercise of ExternalAutonomy: A Multi-FacetedAppraisal, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 945,

945-962 (2006).
34. See Hong Kong Government, supra note 32.
35. For pre-1997 insights, see Gary N. Heilbronn, The Changing Face of Hong
Kong's InternationalAir TransportRelations, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 195, 195-224

(1988); Gary N. Heilbronn, Hong Kong's First Bilateral Air Services Agreement: A
Milestone in Air Law andan Exercise in Limited Sovereignty, 18 HONG KONG L.J. 62-85
(1988); Gary N. Heilbronn, The Travel Industry, in LAW IN HONG KONG 1969-1989 325,
325-359 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1989); ESSAYS ON AVIATION AND TRAVEL LAW IN HONG

KONG (Gary N. Heilbronn ed., 1990).
36.

See Hong Kong Government, supra note 32; YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW

CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC

LAW465, 465-67 (2d ed. 1999).
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instruments. The Basic Law, which falls into the latter category and carries
more practical significance in this context, contains several provisions
designed to solidify Hong Kong's status as a semi-autonomous aviation
hub. Perhaps most noteworthy in this respect is the injunction to the
HKSAR government to furnish conditions and take steps for the
maintenance of the territory's position as a center for international and
regional aviation (Article 128).
In terms of specific arrangements impinging on strategic management,
Hong Kong has been allowed to keep its own aircraft register, albeit in
accordance with guidelines formulated by the Central People's Government
(CPG) regarding nationality marks and registration marks of aircraft
(Article 129). The local register is a branch of its PRC counterpart, and
the aircraft of both entities have the same nationality. 37 At the tactical
and operational level, Hong Kong is responsible for "routine business
and technical management of civil aviation" and the discharge of functions
assigned to it under the regional procedures of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (Article 130). These encompass the technical
administration of airports, air traffic services-communications, navigation
aids, and traffic control-and flight operations.38
The provisions pertaining to the conclusion of air services agreements
are less straightforward, but they leave considerable room for maneuver
for the local authorities. A distinction is drawn between three inherently
different categories of air services: (1) those between Hong Kong and
foreign States; (2) those between Hong Kong and the mainland; and
(3) those between Hong Kong and foreign States which stop over in
Hong Kong. The power to decide on air services falling into the second
category, and operated either by airlines incorporated and having their
principal business in Hong Kong or by their PRC counterparts, is vested
in the CPG, following consultation with the HKSAR government (Article
131). Similarly, category three-type air services accords are concluded
by the CPG, although it needs to take into consideration the "special
conditions and economic interests" of Hong Kong and seek the views of
its government. Moreover representatives of the latter may take part in
negotiations conducted by the CPG regarding such operations (Article
132).

37.
38.

See GHAI, supra note 36, at 465.
See id.

On the other hand, the quantitatively substantial first category involves
air services which are to all intents and purposes the sole responsibility
of the HKSAR government, albeit subject to the proviso that its actions
should be "under specific authorizations" from the CPG (Article 133).
All scheduled air services must be regulated by air services agreements
or provisional accords (i.e., informal agreements). Within this legal
framework, the local authorities make concrete decisions with respect to
the rights of landing or flight over Hong Kong of foreign airlines as well
as the routes for airlines incorporated in the territory. There are no
express constitutional-style provisions for charter or special flights and,
as was previously the case, the relevant licensing is undertaken by the
Hong Kong civil aviation administration.39
This policy pattern, while not devoid of palpable constraints, extends
in some respects beyond that observed during the colonial era, when the
territory was considered, at the strategic level, part of the United
Kingdom for the purposes of international and bilateral air service
accords, and was deemed to be a source of lucrative business for British
airlines. The post-1997 legal architecture does not furnish a mechanism
whereby mainland airlines could tangibly benefit from the exchange of
landing rights and scheduled air services in Hong Kong with foreign
States. The role of the CPG, both actual and potential, particularly the
latter, should not be minimized. 40 The constitutional arrangements and
power dynamics may tempt the authorities in Beijing to intervene, but
there is no solid precedent to suggest this is a realistic prospect. For the
foreseeable future, Hong Kong is likely to enjoy a high degree of autonomy
in tactical and operational matters--coupled with a meaningful, albeit
not unlimited, measure of strategic independence and corresponding
obligations.4 '
During the early phases of the post-1997 international realignment,
mainland corporate State and State-influenced interests, notably the
China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and Citic Pacific (the
latter is in fact incorporated in the territory and publicly traded on its
stock market), sought to build a stake in the two principal Hong Kong
"designated" airlines, Cathay Pacific and Dragonair. This may have
constituted an attempt to establish a channel for exercising, directly and
indirectly, greater control over aviation policy in a capitalist enclave that
is being reabsorbed into China, yet within a potentially problematic
loose politico-economic framework, and an industry widely perceived as
39. See id. at 466.
40. See id.
41. See Mushkat, Hong Kong's Exercise of External Autonomy: A Multi-Faceted
Appraisal, supra note 33.
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istu

strategic in nature. It is thus interesting to note in this context that this
trend has partly been reversed and that deliberate divestment has
selectively replaced focused investment as a key corporate goal of the
players involved. Cross-border cooperation, primarily between Cathay
Pacific and Air China, still looms on the agenda, but it has increasingly
commercial underpinnings that have no overtly adverse implications for
Hong Kong's ability to chart its own semi-independent course.43
An elaborate institutional infrastructure has been erected to sustain
this historical pattern well into the future-with the Transportation and
Housing Bureau (THB), the Civil Aviation Department (CAD), and the
Airport Authority (AA) functioning as its core. The THB exercises overall
policy responsibility for civil aviation. Its principal activities include
high-level oversight over the work of the CAD, liaison with the AA
regarding civil aviation-related matters, and the conduct of air services
negotiations (with the Air Services Division of the CAD playing a supporting
role). The CAD and AA, the two policy implementing organizational
arms, are responsible for civil aviation management and for providing,
operating, maintaining, and developing the HKIA respectively.
As matters stand, the AA functions as a government-owned statutory
corporation subject to terms stated in the Airport Authority Ordinance.
The board overseeing its activities however comprises non-public
officers as well as public ones. Moreover, the AA is legally bound to
conduct its business according to sound commercial principles. Indeed,
its privatization in one form or another may be undertaken in the not too
distant future. Private sector participation in the provision of airport
services has traditionally been widespread and this remains the case
today. Further material progress in that direction, which is expected
soon, barring unforeseen developments, should reinforce Hong Kong's
position as a player enjoying considerable autonomy in the aviation
domain and one capable of employing strategic, as distinct from merely
tactical and operational, discretion in pursuit of its goals.45
The latest figures available lend solid support to this conclusion. They
show that Hong Kong has thus far signed air services agreements with
42. See GHAI, supra note 36, at 466.
43. See Cathay Pacific Press Release, Hong Kong Strengthens its Role as the
Premier Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Hub Under Shareholding Realignment (June 9,
2006), http://www.cathaypacific.com/cpa/en INTL/aboutus/pressroomdetails?reflD=66b
7b40b0e0fb010VgnVCM32000011 d21c39 (last visited on Jan. 24, 2009).
44. See Hong Kong Government, supra note 32.
45. See id; Mushkat & Mushkat, supra note 1.

fifty-eight different countries across the globe: (Australia, Austria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea,
Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam). Overflight accords
have also been signed with a number of countries (the Maldives and
former Soviet Republics such as Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, and
Ukraine).46

There is no concrete evidence to suggest such agreements heavily
draw their inspiration from Beijing, an observation that apparently
applies, albeit perhaps not to the same extent, with respect to Macau, the
former Portuguese colony, and as of 1999 another special administrative
region of the PRC. 47 China has been negotiating its air services agreements
with other parties, where the interests of Hong Kong and Macau are not
directly involved, in its own way and at times with different consequences.
Its style in approaching these matters has definitely, and understandably,
diverged from that of the two special administrative regions. The gap
between the final products may have been less pronounced, because air
services accords inevitably display a certain degree of uniformity in key
areas, but this does not detract from the fact no full convergence has
taken place.48
Plans are formulated to insure that Hong Kong possesses the necessary
physical, as well as institutional, capabilities to continue progressing
smoothly along its semi-independent path. According to the HKIA 2025
Blueprint, which reflects its long-term goals and corresponding projections,
the AA is expected to take systematic steps toward establishing a
seamless network of air, rail, road, and sea links in order to solidify
HKIA's role as the pivot of a well-integrated multimode transportation
system connecting the entire Pearl River Delta region to a wide range of
46.
47.

Hong Kong Government, supra note 32.
For an overview, see Josd Tomds Baganha, Macau Civil Aviation and Recent

Developments in Air CarrierLiability, 28 HONG KONG L.J. 90, 90-103 (1998).

48. For an overview, see Gabriel S. Meyer, U.S.-China Aviation Relations: Flight
Path Toward Open Skies?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 427, 427-56 (2002); Alex Burkett,
China's Two-Dimensional Skies: The "Chineseness" ofAviation Law in China and How
it Helps us to Understand Chinese Law, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 251, 251-74

(2007); Jiangtian Xu, Open Skies Agreement between China and European Union: Paper
for Intensive Program of Master of Euroculture Program (undated), available at
http://www.euroculturemaster.org/default.aspx?sec=3 &sub=4.
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international destinations. It is estimated that the HKIA will annually
serve about 80 million passengers and handle approximately 8 million tons
of cargo, seeing around 490,000 aircraft movements in the process, in
2025. The AA and CAD are collaborating closely in an effort to
maximize the capacity of the existing two runways and the former is
to embark
on a feasibility study focusing on the construction of a third
49
one.

On the face of it, this is a backdrop conducive to policy boldness,
flexibility, and innovation. Given the deeply entrenched laissez-faire
bureaucratic culture, constitutionally-derived-and arguably rooted in
international law-scope for autonomous action, impressive financial
resources, and substantial institutional and physical capabilities, Hong
Kong should to all appearances bask in the limelight as a pioneer in
deregulating the aviation industry in general and resolutely embracing
the open skies architecture in particular. Yet, as matters stand, the
territory is accorded scarcely any attention in major studies devoted to
the liberalization of air services in Asia, where countries not known for a
single-minded commitment to the neoclassical economic credo feature
prominently,5 ° and its adherence to open skies principles, let alone their
51
dedicated promotion at home and abroad, has been rather lukewarm.
It is a moot point whether Hong Kong should be realistically expected
to be at the forefront of the movement to deregulate the aviation industry
in Asia, as distinct from being selectively viewed as a potential model
for others. Because of its small size, the domestic market for air services
is virtually nonexistent and this normally constitutes the principal target
for liberalization efforts, at least during the initial phases of the
restructuring process. By the same token, with some exceptions, the
territory's aviation industry has historically not been the subject of tight
economic regulation, the noneconomic side, including safety, has been
much more closely managed by the government. The corollary is that
49.

See Hong Kong Government, supra note 32.

See FLYING HIGH: LIBERALIZING CIVIL AVIATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC (Gary C.
Hufbauer & Christopher Findlay eds., 1996); ASIA PACIFIC AIR TRANSPORT:
CHALLENGES AND POLICY REFORMS (Christopher Findlay, Chia Lin Sien & Karmjit
Singh eds., 1997); DIPENDRA SINHA, DEREGULATION AND LIBERALIZATION OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: ASIA, EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND OCEANIA (2001).
51.
See KAI-SUN KWONG, TOWARDS OPEN SKIES AND UNCONGESTED AIRPORTS: AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR HONG KONG (1988); C.K. Law & Raymond Yeung, The Reality of
"Open Skies" and its Relevance for Hong Kong, Hong Kong Policy Research Institute
Research Press Briefing, Apr. 5, 2000, http://www.hkpri.org.hk/passagesPDF/policy
50.

GroupReport/2000/The%20 Reality05AprilOO.pdf.

the Hong Kong experience perhaps does not provide illuminating
insights into the challenges posed by the liberalization of air services
and, for this reason, may have not attracted strong interest on the part of
policy analysts.
Such defensive logic cannot be readily applied to strategies directed at
open skies arrangements. This is a regulatory domain where, in
principle, ardent proponents of laissez-faire tenets and policies might
venture beyond the kind of progressive bilateralism emphatically
preached and selectively practiced by the United States. A compelling
argument could be put forth that, irrespective of the paths followed by
other players in the global aviation arena, Hong Kong should open its
skies unconditionally. This would not be tantamount to free entry and
thus need not conjure up uncomfortable images of disorderly market
conditions. There are sophisticated institutional mechanisms for controlling
access without undermining efficiency, equity, and freedom and the
local bureaucracy is well-versed in their structural features and has
acquired considerable experience in operating them. Notably, landing
rights can be economically and fairly allocated to airlines via auction in
a manner similar to the process relied upon in making public land
commercially available to private property developers in the territory.52
Designing and implementing a scheme embodying such seemingly
radical characteristics, while not technically infeasible, may prove to be
an inherently difficult undertaking, even in a highly favorable politicostrategic climate. The possibility that Hong Kong, its apparent neoclassical
policy mindset notwithstanding, could somehow fall short of being able
to stretch the prevailing rules that far, effectively abandoning them
altogether and proceeding in a solo fashion, on a scale that would be
unprecedented in the aviation industry, should not be ruled out altogether.
If this were the case, it would still be reasonable to expect the territory to
adopt a maximalist version of the existing bilateral formula. After all,
the content parameters are not rigid and the loose multilateral
underpinnings of the system leave ample scope for any two countries to
vary them according to specific interests and circumstances.
Content is merely one of a number of pivotal elements in the equation.
Geographic breadth, pace of adoption, and the extent of the initiative
displayed in the process loom potentially large as well. The geographic
network of bilateral accords may be wide or narrow, open skies-type
innovations may be implemented expeditiously or slowly, and the parties
involved may exercise leadership in promoting relevant functional
52. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Allocation of Ultra Scarce Property
Rights in Hong Kong: A Policy Evaluation, 39 INTERNATIONALES ASIENFORUM: INT'L Q.
FOR ASIA STUD. 137, 137-61 (2008).
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frameworks-at home and, more importantly, beyond their borders-or
opt for a generally passive role. The geographic breadth factor however
does not merit further examination here-as distinct from other
jurisdictional contexts. It has already been shown that Hong Kong is
able and willing to enter into bilateral agreements with a truly wide
range of countries from different parts of the globe and that the elaborate
network of commercial relationships which it has keenly established is
highly heterogeneous in nature from a politico-economic perspective.
On the other hand, pace and initiative, particularly of the regional and
international variety, is a legitimate issue for critical consideration. It
has been previously noted that not all Asian, or, for that matter, European,
countries have reacted to the American economic liberalization drive at
roughly the same speed. New Zealand and Singapore have been singled
out for being more responsive than others. By the same token, the open
skies architecture has been the subject of occasional efforts, which have
not necessarily borne fruit, to substantially enhance it. An example of an
ambitious initiative of this nature is the European Commission's
blueprint for a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA) which
"would not simply comprise the standard exchange of rights under open
skies. It would also set the stage for negotiating beyond the classic five
53
freedoms, and comprise a shared and completely open market environment.
The fundamental premise in this context is that, given the overall
strategic backdrop, Hong Kong should be a fast mover and that, where
appropriate, it should be at the forefront of such initiatives.
Yet, other than in terms of geographic breadth, Hong Kong's
performance can be said to have fallen short of economically wellgrounded expectations. Despite strong exhortations to this effect from
libertarian policy analysts, the territory has not unambiguously opened
its skies on an indiscriminating basis. Quite the contrary, it has
consistently favored bilateral arrangements and has vigorously espoused
their merits. Suggestions for genuinely market-style unilateral action,
with no traditional insistence on full reciprocity, have been rejected as
conceptually dubious and practically flawed. This attitudinal constellation
has undergone no palpable transformation in the face of dramatic shifts
in the global aviation industry and marked changes in local politicoeconomic conditions.5 4 Even China's gradual embrace of the open
53.
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skies platform (albeit the bilateral version) has had no ramifications in
this respect.55
The second content-related question, whether the prevailing rules of
the bilateral open skies regime have been fully utilized, must also be
answered in the negative, although less emphatically so. On the positive side,
Hong Kong has effectively dispensed with rigid restrictions requiring
airlines to be predominantly owned by nationals of the designating State.
Cathay Pacific, the leading "local" carrier, which has recently acquired
Dragonair, was founded by an American and an Australian, and has been
significantly controlled throughout its history by corporate entities with
British colonial roots (Butterfield & Swire and Swire Pacific). The Air
China stake in the airline amounts to merely 17.5% and Swire Pacific, a
Hong Kong based conglomerate but one that cannot be portrayed as a
national organizational vehicle, even though its stake in Air China has
been lifted to 20% following the 2006 realignment, continues to be the
most prominent shareholder.
On the negative side, the local government has steadfastly adhered to
the "one route-one airline" policy, principally in relation to Cathay
Pacific and Dragonair at relevant junctures. The underlying argument is
that, if a certain route is adequately served by an operating airline, opening
it to another would not be an economically compelling proposition. The
reason apparently lies in the fact that this would lead to excess capacity,
deterioration in airline profitability, erosion of service standards, and
loss of consumer welfare. The available empirical evidence-obtained
elsewhere--does not lend solid support to such assertions. Alternative
justifications may conceivably be invoked for this purpose, but the
economic logic relied upon is not entirely sound. Competitive pressures
are indeed substantially reduced as a result, yet the consequences, in
terms of producer efficiency and benefits
to the consumer, are less
56
favorable than the official line suggests.
Nor has the pace of implementation of the open skies platform has
been particularly impressive. It is not easy to generalize over the relevant
time period and across the whole geographic spectrum, but at least
during the initial phases and in key areas, or vis-A-vis major players,
progress has been distinctly unhurried. The Hong Kong economic
regime is far more liberal overall than that of the United States and it is
uncommon for American policy makers to prod their local counterparts
into laissez-faire style action, yet this has been the pattern on the open
skies front. After negotiations between the two sides had dragged on for
years and had culminated in restrictive accords, former U.S. Secretary of
55.
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Transportation, Norman Mineta, thus somewhat uncharacteristically
chose to remind the audience in a speech delivered to the American
Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong on April 19, 2005, that the
territory would gain more passengers, more 57commerce, and stronger
airlines by joining the bilateral open skies tide.
The corollary inevitably is that Hong Kong has been a laggard rather
than a leader in the deregulation of the international aviation industry. It
is perhaps unrealistic to expect a relatively small territory not wielding
sovereign power to be a source of bold initiatives in the global arena,
other than by example. Opportunities have nevertheless presented
themselves over the years to exercise leadership in the regional context.
Libertarian policy analysts have put forth recommendations for simultaneous
open skies schemes involving a host of Asia-Pacific countries
(Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the
United States) as well as the United Kingdom (by virtue of its position
vis-A-vis Hong Kong during the colonial era), but these have not been
systematically pursued.58 Instead, the territory has opted for a low-profile
approach and has, from time to time, merely perfunctorily welcomed
steps taken toward open skies elsewhere-notably China.
This counterintuitive strategic configuration has attracted virtually no
attention on the part of legal scholars. Indeed, the study of aviation law
in Hong Kong-encompassing its descriptive, explanatory, and evaluative
facets-has largely grounded to a halt in recent years. Economic
researchers have displayed greater interest in the subject, producing two
broad-based assessments, typically geared toward the evaluative dimension
of the topic. The first was undertaken during the early decades of the
international liberalization era, 59 and the second is of a more contemporary
vintage. 60 Reflecting the progressive evolution of policy throughout this
lengthy period, the former yielded a negative verdict and the latter a
mixed one. However, neither has adequately addressed the explanatory
aspects, nor has shed sufficient light on the persistent gap between "what
is" (the actual outcomes) and "what ought to be" (the "ideal" outcomes),
and has even tentatively explored the general theoretical implications of
57. See Press Release, Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State, U.S. Official Urges Hong Kong to Liberalize Aviation Market
(Apr. 25, 2005) http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/April/20050419135
710ajesrom0.6268732.html (last visited on Jan. 24, 2009).
58.
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that divergence. These issues are of considerable significance, in the
local context and beyond, and merit a proper place on the academic
agenda.
IV. QUEST FOR ANALYTICAL EXPLANATION
There is no dearth of conceptual schemes designed to pinpoint factors
shaping policy patterns. Some are intended to be comprehensive in
nature, encompassing virtually all domains of government activity, and
others are tailored to circumstances prevailing in specific spheres of
public sector intervention. 6 The ones most pertinent in this context refer
to regulatory controls rather than all forms of service provision or
equivalent. Since regulation is a predominantly domestic function, they
exhibit a strong "home bias". This nevertheless does not materially detract
from their usefulness, because the lack of a pronounced international
orientation is not highly inconsistent with extant political realities, or a
global power constellation characterized by loose supranational controls.
Moreover, the international perspective, while occupying a peripheral
position within the overall analytical framework, is by no means
completely overlooked.
Several theoretical insights have been generated on the dominant
domestic side and meaningful efforts have been made to classify them in
a methodical fashion. A number of potentially appealing permutations
are thus available for research purposes. The one selected here contains
elements that commonly feature in analytical inquiries into the underpinnings
of regulatory behavior. Although not exhaustive, it is detailed yet
parsimonious. It includes five broad categories: public interest theories,
interest group theories, private
62 interest theories, force of ideas explanations,
and institutional theories.
They are not invariably homogenous and,
where appropriate, further subdivision may be necessary. It ought again
to be emphasized that they are not ideally suited for dissecting regulation
at the supranational level. This need not pose a serious problem however
as aviation is subject to a mixture of domestic and bilateral controls. In
addition, as indicated, an international conceptual perspective can be
incorporated into the analytical scheme.
Public interest theories posit that regulatory activity largely constitutes
a response to concerns encapsulated in goals mirroring a desire to
maximize community welfare. The underlying assumption is that the
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parties involved are not primarily self-seeking and ultimately function as
agents for the public interest. The promotion of parochial objectives is
not ruled out, yet it is subject to the condition that self-seeking conduct
must be strictly of the instrumental variety and coincide with--or, better
still, be subservient to-the pursuit of the public interest (e.g., measures
to control private activity may at the same time enhance the reelection
prospects of a politician advocating them and consumer well-being). To
state it differently, the embedded preferences for the public interest
ought to be genuine and terminal.63
The notion of maximizing collective welfare through government
channels is fraught with considerable difficulties. The concept of public
interest is opaque and cannot be readily managed in the political arena.
Despite its vagueness and the absence of robust institutional mechanisms
to facilitate its articulation, it is deemed to be a workable explanatory
tool which may cautiously be employed in dissecting regulatory behavior.
The validity of this observation varies from one political setting to
another. It applies less effectively to authoritarian polities than liberal
ones. The latter provide an institutional environment where, other things
being equal, agents for the public interest may carry out their fiduciary
duties, within a principal-agent framework, more faithfully than in a
nondemocratic milieu resting on fragile legal foundations.6 4

In authoritarian settings, the common good is typically equated with
the particularistic, paternalistic, or personal preferences of a specific
individual, group or organization, or system. However, this does not imply
that in liberal ones it invariably assumes the form of national/social
goals which unambiguously supersede private interests. It may be the
product of political balancing (featuring the simultaneous fulfillment of
key facets of different particularistic aspirations), elaborate compromise
(whereby particularistic agendas are scaled back in order to attain a measure
of collective equilibrium), and strategic tradeoff (involving tangible

63.

See id. at 19-21;

REGULATION:

BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CREATING, DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS 91-108

(1980); Roger G. Noll, Governmental Regulatory Behavior: A MultidisciplinarySurvey
and Synthesis, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9, 18-24 (Roger G.

Noll ed., 1985); Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott & Christopher Hood, Introduction, in A
READER ON REGULATION 9-10 (Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott & Christopher Hood eds.,

1998); ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 29-54
(1994); BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
REGULATION: TEXT AND MATERIALS 17-44 (2007).
64.

See sources cited supra note 63.

concessions to particularistic interests but also concrete sacrifices on
their part, an inherently problematic combination yet one that allows
progress toward a target selectively embodying the characteristics of the
common good).65
To complicate matters, perceptions of the public interest are often
shaped by forces originating outside the regulatory arena. According to
the external-signal theory, institutions charged with serving the common
good struggle to come to grips with it because of its elusive nature.
Consequently, they observe the responses to their decisions by other
parties and draw inferences about the correspondence between these
decisions and the hard-to-grasp concept of the public interest. The
relevant parties in such circumstances may include the judiciary, the
legislature, segments of the executive branch, pressure groups, professional
associations, the scientific community, networks of technical experts, the
media, constituents, and the public-at-large. Academic-style research
selectively conducted by such parties may, play a role in helping to
crystallize the notion of the common good.
For the most part, the idea of the public interest does not loom large in
theories primarily focused on the impact of pressure or interest group
activity on regulatory outcomes. Such conceptual schemes tend to place
the emphasis on competition for power among groups with divergent
objectives, rather than public spiritedness in one form or another, as the
key determinant of policy evolution. Certain variants are not entirely
inconsistent with the balancing, compromise, or even tradeoff offshoots
of public interest theories, but they are generally tilted further away from
the idea of common good. These and other variants which fall into that
broad category range from open-ended pluralism to narrow-based
corporatism. The former centers on the competitive interplay between
diverse elements in the political arena and the latter focuses on the
selective partnership between the State and prominent corporate entities
from which non-participants are to all intents and purposes excluded.67
Private interest theories of regulation dispense with the notion of the
common good altogether. They are predicated on the assumption that
policy is driven by private interests rather than their public or group
counterparts, although the distinction between private and group elements at
times becomes blurred in the process of analytical elaboration. The nonembracement or abandonment of the common good ideal is believed to

65. See MITNICK, supra note 63, at 92-93.
66. See Noll, supra note 63, at 41-52.
67. See MITNICK, supra note 63, at 99-111; Baldwin, Cave & Hood, supra note
62, at 9-10; BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 62, at 21; OGUS, supra note 63, at 69-71;
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be the result of goal deflection in regulatory agencies. Such bodies are
normally established in order to correct market failure-rooted, for
example, in public goods, externalities, asymmetric information, moral
hazard, deviations from perfect competition, distributive anomaliesand insure a close alignment between private initiative and community
welfare. For various reasons, however, this mission is not pursued in
earnest from inception or undergoes significant erosion over time. As a
consequence,
the regulatory agenda is skewed in favor of private
68
interests.
One explanation offered in this context is that agencies engaged in
regulation are in fact set up at the behest of producers in the private
sector, individual corporations or corporate networks, rather than to
promote the common good, cartel theory. A complementary perspective
suggests that the initial intentions of organizational architects are
honorable, but that State organs are inherently vulnerable to being
effectively taken over by special interests, capture theory. This may
sound counterintuitive, yet regulation may yield tangible benefits for
producers. Among other things, it may protect them by introducing
shared rules for corporate behavior and, like cartelization, foster institutional
forms that diffuse competitive pressures (e.g., restrict entry, pave way
for concentration of market power, and provide scope for price
manipulation). This argument is not without Marxist foundations, but it
is developed within a Chicago-style neoclassical framework.69
If such theoretical propositions are valid, they cast doubt on the
consumer protection hypothesis underlying conceptual schemes that
accord primacy to the public interest. According to this viewpoint,
whatever their avowed purpose, regulatory agencies do little in practice
to protect consumers. Adopting the perversion hypothesis, or asserting
that in reality the common good is perverted in the public-private arena,
may stretch this logic to uncomfortable extremes. A more accurate
reflection is furnished by the no-effect hypothesis, claiming that regulation
generates no gains for the community but is a costly undertaking, and its
producer protection counterpart, postulating that, contrary to expectations,
the actual outcome of regulation is an environment supportive of

68. See MITNICK, supra note 63, at 108-155; Noll, supra note 63, at 24-41;
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uncompetitive business practices attractive to well-entrenched producers.7 °
Private influences on regulation need not originate outside the public
sector. Political economists also contend that organizations and officials
directly engage in the process may be regarded, for analytical purposes,
as self-focused enterprises and entrepreneurs, respectively. At the
organizational level, this may manifest itself in the pursuit of objectives
geared toward enhancing the interests of the regulatory agency rather
than community welfare, the organization in this case is public, but the
interests impinging on the performance of its functions-for example,
agency-specific budget maximization--qualify as private. At the individual
level, similar behavioral patterns may be discerned. Regulators may thus
seek to improve their reelection, if politicians, or career, if bureaucrats,
prospects instead of channeling their energies into the formulation and
implementation of strategies conducive to the common good.7'
Like their public interest counterparts, private interest theories of
regulation are not without their critics who express misgivings about the
conceptual underpinnings and empirical fit to behavioral realities. The
concerns voiced have to a degree shifted the politico-economic agenda
in a slightly different and less ambitious direction by giving rise to agency
theories, also referred to as post-revisionist accounts. Such perspectives
primarily center on the problems encountered in exercising regulatory
control over organizations and individuals. They are typically couched
in microeconomic terms, often revolving around the notion of
transaction costs. The emergence of this trend, which may be portrayed
as complementary rather than competing, should not materially detract
from the effectiveness of private interest theories of regulation as a
stylized analytical tool capable of selectively yielding illuminating
conceptual insights.72
Force of ideas explanations of policy development give prominence to
intellectual conceptions "which express how and why the government
ought to control business.,, 73 This time-honored notion is not always
rigorously formulated, but it continues to be widely shared. It was
vibrantly stated by Keynes, the founding father of modem macroeconomics,
who emphatically opined that the "ideas of economists and political
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philosophers ... are more powerful than is commonly understood.

Indeed the world is ruled by little else."74 This seemingly innocuous
proposition came to haunt him when his own notions regarding the
public regulation of private enterprise came under relentless attack by
neoclassical economists and unsympathetic policy makers in the 1980's.
Today, it is perhaps most effectively encapsulated in the concept of
loquocentric societies where ideas, if deployed persuasively, may
prompt people to act in a manner not entirely consistent with their
narrow interests.75
Some academic commentators voice skepticism with respect to the
force of the ideas themselves, or their content, and are inclined to
attribute the impact to packaging. For example, McCloskey cites cynical
witticisms circulating in the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers in the
1980's, which reflect misgivings of "insider" economists about the
notion that policy is the product of scientific experiments of the hardscience variety: "Mankiw's Maxim: No issue in economics has even
been decided on the basis of facts. Nihilistic Corollary I: No issue has
ever been decided on the basis of theory either., 76 He proceeds to argue
that persuasiveness in economics does not hinge on empirical or logical
rigor. Rather, it stems from the ability to successfully employ crucial
rhetorical skills in the appropriate political context
and thus enhance the
77
appeal of essentially contestable arguments.
Institutional theories of regulation veer even further away from the
concept of interest, whether public or private. Their proponents assert
that policies are embedded in complex organizational structures which
are governed by a plethora of behavior constraining and determining
substantive and procedural rules. The scope for consistently maximizing
the common good or one's utility in such settings is distinctly limited.
The same holds true for striking intergroup bargains. The rule-bound
structures evolve slowly over time and are shaped by a multitude of
factors, including ones highly macroscopic in nature (e.g., culture). The
74.
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different strands of institutionalism, whether cultural, historical, organizational,
socio-legal, sociological, and a neo-institutional variant, mirror this
diversity. The corollary is that gaining deep insight into the relevant
structural and functional dimensions of the broad organizational
architecture is a precondition for coming to grips with the intricacies of
the regulatory process. 78
The international side of the picture has been explored in a more
selective and tentative fashion. As indicated, this pattern has its roots in
a configuration characterized by domestic initiative and supranational
fragility. The global aviation system is not atypical in this respect in that
it is based on a negotiated order, and a bilateral one to boot. Three
distinct approaches have emerged in this space: the Grenoble regulation
school, the Parisian regulation school, and the American international
regime school. They tend however to be preoccupied with level-ofanalysis issues-productive system, nation State, or supranational
entities-definitional matters, and structural and functional questions
that are not firmly linked to theories of regulatory development. One
notable exception to the norm is the recourse for explanatory purposes to
the concepts of hegemonic power, exercised by the dominant nation
State, and hegemonic stability associated with it. Both may shed light
on the dynamics of regulation in the global
economic arena and the
79
modus operandi of players who inhabit it.
The twin theories of hegemonic power and hegemonic stability
provide a logical starting point for endeavoring to explain the evolution
of Hong Kong's open skies strategy. The global aviation system can
scarcely be portrayed as a level playing field. It has been unambiguously
dominated by the United States during the entire modern era. It has also
been remarkably stable overall at the macro level. Superior American
economic power, reinforced by robust political leadership, has been a
major source of cohesion, albeit in a form not necessarily universally
welcome. U.S. aviation policies have not fluctuated widely because the
underlying intellectual climate has undergone few material changes.
Reformist ideas have exerted great influence at critical junctures, but
there have been just two clearly discernible paradigm shifts since the
early twentieth century. The Great Depression experience paved the way
for Keynesian-style tight control of private enterprise and perceived
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interventionist excesses provoked a libertarian backlash culminating in
the emergence of the deregulation movement in the late 1970's.
Stability should not be equated with a steady state. Gradual structural
and functional transformation, falling short of a complete metamorphosis,
has been a common feature of system adaptation. Force of ideas accounts
may not elucidate it fully. Berstein, for example, has resorted to lifecycle theory, predominantly of the private interest variety, in order to
shed analytical light on the slow erosion of common good-oriented
values in the face of capture-like pressures in the period extending from
the 1930's to the 1950's. According to him, regulation inevitably progresses
through the following stages: gestation (concerns with market failure
lead to the creation of a regulatory agency), youth (the inexperienced
regulatory agency is outmaneuvered bythe regulatees but is sustained by
a crusading zeal), maturity (political support for agency objectives
diminishes and devitalization sets in; needs of industry begin to take
precedence over those of the community), and old age (symptoms of
atrophy proliferate and private interests become paramount).,s Such
microscopic changes however need not significantly detract from the
stability of the system.
It may be argued that, in an environment dominated by a large and
assertive hegemon, and one not susceptible to notable structural and
functional shifts over the short term horizon, small and resource-poor, in
the sense of not being able to effectively employ politico-economic
leverage in the global arena, players like Hong Kong may not enjoy
sufficient scope for displaying strategic initiative and may not have the
incentive to do so, given the system's inherent stability. This may partly
explain the territory's reactive posture regarding the open skies project.
Opportunistic adaptation seems a more realistic option than active leadership
in those circumstances. It would probably be unproductive-in light of
the prevailing constraints, limited opportunities, and competing goals-to
proactively pursue that otherwise apparently appealing liberal idea on a
substantial geographic scale.
In recent years, a trend toward regionalization of the open skies
blueprint has emerged because of the difficulties posed by a quantum
leap beyond bilateralism at the global level, the Transatlantic Common
Aviation Area plan is merely one manifestation of this phenomenon.
Hong Kong could have thus exhibited greater initiative in the Asian
80.
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context. It is a moot point of course whether it would have been
possible to leave the United States out of the regional picture as aviation
challenges on that front are normally addressed in broader Asia-Pacific
rather than narrower Asian terms. The hegemonic factor is again not
entirely irrelevant here. Its explanatory power nevertheless is more
modest and other conceptual schemes, taking into account the China
shadow and domestic influences, may need to be relied upon for this
purpose. After all, in both the global and regional domains, indeed, even
the strictly bilateral ones, Hong Kong has displayed less individual and
collective determination than New Zealand and Singapore, for example.
Public officials would doubtless claim, and not without certain
justification, that they have been primarily seeking to serve the common
good rather than passively adapting to stimuli originating from external
sources. There are numerous conceptions of the public interest. Mitnick
has identified a number of dimensions allowing to systematically
classify them and has constructed a complex but workable typology on
this basis. 8 1 In terms of some of the key criteria that he has suggested,
the notion of the common good implicitly espoused by Hong Kong
policy makers in this instance is probably combinatorial, there exist
multiple sets of preferences for a course of action; the search for the
public interest entails selecting a combination from those sets, a mixture
of impositional and moderately consensual-instead of being the
product of elaborate consensus building or pluralistic aggregation;
impositional is more appropriate adjective than dictatorial because Hong
Kong practices limited democracy which continues to be underpinned by
British-style common law-and rule determined-the handful of
participants involved in the process of effectively defining the public
interest follow a set of well-defined procedures; the outcome is deemed
to be consistent with the common good. To the extent that the
consensual aspects reflect the general views of a specific group, such as
economic researchers, engineering experts, and legal commentators,
instead of the community-at-large, there may be scope for incorporating
them in a less ambiguous fashion into the public interest equation.
Lawyers paint a largely favorable picture, albeit one that needs to be
updated.82 At the technical end of the analytical spectrum, scarcely any
strategic assessments have been offered by members of the engineering
profession, they may have been more active at the tactical and
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operational level, albeit not in public forums, but not necessarily from an
overtly critical perspective. This may be construed as an indication of
tacit approval. It should be noted however that legal scholars and
practitioners who have addressed the subject in a rigorous fashion in the
Hong Kong context have mostly confined themselves to the noneconomic
facets of regulation.8 3 This particular side of the topic has been explored
by economists alone. Overall, they initially adopted a negative tone yet,
as the regulatory regime has assumed a more flexible and sophisticated
84
form, their observations have shifted in a generally positive direction.
The specific open skies component of the system has nevertheless
85
remained a bone of contention, producing divergent responses.
Those who provide their seal of qualified approval emphasize the
seemingly distinctive features of the aviation industry. It is characterized by
an undifferentiated product which is highly perishable, ease of entry,
tendency toward monopoly or oligopoly, ease of entry notwithstanding,
growth rate exceeding by a substantial margin that witnessed in many
other industries, high capital intensity-which becomes more pronounced
over time; labor intensity, on the other hand, diminishes--economies of
scale/scope/density, network externalities, product externalities, strong
locational influences, homogeneous production technology, greater-thanusual financial vulnerability, airlines often receive earlier-ordered aircraft/
boost capacity before demand/traffic materializes on a corresponding
scale, considerable sensitivity to changes in business cycle conditions,
selectively
and elevated debt/equity ratios. Such features to all appearances
86
liberalization.
far-reaching
and
fast-paced
against
militate
From a public interest perspective, some economists have taken the
position-broadly consistent with the loosely articulated government
stance-that the aviation industry is of fundamental strategic importance
for the highly open and resource-poor Hong Kong economy. The
corollary is that its distinctive characteristics should loom large on the
regulatory agenda and impart a degree of caution to decisions relating to
market structure and conduct. This is particularly true with respect to
issues at the heart of the open skies strategy such as the unilateral

83. See id.
84. See Kai-sun Kwong, The New Airport and Aviation in Hong Kong-A New
Perspective (Nov. 1990), available at http://www.hku.hk/hkcer/articles/v5/rkwong. htm.
85. See KWONG, supra note 51; Law & Yeung, supra note 51.
86. See O'CONNOR, supra note 3, at 5-7, 13-19, 22-23; Law & Yeung, supra note
51.

opening of the market and the one route-one airline configuration. The
starting point in the multistep argument focuses on network and product
externalities. Given the widespread reliance on hub-and-spoke facilities,
an additional route confers external benefits on members of an existing
network and new entrants, network externalities. By the same token,
cargo and passenger services are complementary products in the aviation
industry, product externalities. Airlines thus endeavor to enhance their
performance by attaining an optimal mix of cargo and passengers via
hub operations. In such an environment, rapid and wholesale liberalization
could have a very uneven impact on existing market participants and
new entrants. Uncertainty might rise significantly as a consequence,
potentially eroding in the long run the strength of Hong Kong "designated"
or "home" carriers and the territory's status as a thriving aviation hub.87
The "home" carrier-aviation hub synergies are deemed to be considerable
in this context. This stems from the fact that a healthy home carrier is
the ideal vehicle for expanding the trunk routes and extending the air
services network for the hub. Such an operator is a particularly valuable
instrument for building cross-border airline and aviation alliances.
Further, a strong home carrier, with headquarters located at its domestic
base, has much more pronounced linkage and multiplier effects on the
local economy than foreign operators. In addition, from a national
security viewpoint, it can insure a stable supply of air services for the
hub at delicate junctures (e.g., when external pressures in one form or
another may bring about a disruption). Last but not least, a home carrier
is a source of prestige for the hub, an admittedly intangible but by no
means worthless politico-economic commodity, especially for a global
metropolis lacking sovereign power and unambiguous identity.88
Another major claim put forth in support of the cautionary thesis is
that both sequential and simultaneous liberalization of the cargo and
passenger markets could prove problematic, albeit in different ways.
These two markets are heterogeneous, but they employ a homogeneous
production technology. The former is much less controlled by local
carriers in Hong Kong than is the case elsewhere in Asia. It would be
the first candidate for unilateral liberalization, if such a strategic shift
materialized. The benefits would accrue to users of cargo services, yet
passengers might be adversely affected. Moreover, the gains could prove
transitory as a handful of foreign mega carriers might sooner or later
emerge as the dominant players in the market. A unilateral opening of
Hong Kong's skies along the entire product spectrum could benefit
certain classes of passengers (e.g., those flying economy) yet not others
87.
88.

See Law & Yeung, supra note 51.
See id.
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(e.g., those flying business). It might also lead to deterioration in the
operational efficiency and service quality of the home carriers.89
The seemingly controversial one route-one airline policy is portrayed
in a similar vein. While it does not comfortably accord with the theory
of contestable markets, practical experience generally vindicates it.
Specifically, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have followed
the same path and their record suggests that effective competition
between domestic airlines operating internationally can be maintained
within this framework. Such a structural pattern may also be conducive
to the development of a unified, as distinct from fragmented, aviation
network. It is further asserted that the commercial performance of
Cathay Pacific, the principal home carrier, has not been sufficiently
exceptional to infer that the somewhat conservative approach, from a
standard economic perspective, toward the evolving open skies platform
has been materially shaped by other than public interest considerations.9"
This view however is not universally shared across the professional
spectrum and may be selectively challenged. 91 The home carrier-hub
synergies, the likely fallout from unilateral liberalization, and the
attractions of the one route-one airline policy appear to be overstated.
The analysis seems to be tilted toward the producer side and may reflect
greater concern for stability, perhaps understandably so in the uncertain
Hong Kong political context, than other strategic values-including
dynamic, as distinct from static, efficiency. The long-term benefits to
consumers of a radical overhaul may not be accorded sufficient attention
and different classes of customers (e.g., those flying economy versus
those flying business) are treated equally. The possibility of realizing
the advantages of far-reaching (albeit not necessarily fast-paced)
liberalization, while largely avoiding the negative side-effects via
innovative regulatory means not currently relied upon, is not seriously
explored. The assumption that policy is inspired by perceptions of the
common good, as well as underpinned by "correct" administrative
procedures, need not been discarded, but additional theoretical insights
are required.
Pressure group activity may not provide further illumination.
Transportation is a vital and heavily politicized (by local standards)

89.
90.
91.

See id.
See id.
See KWONG, supra note 51.

sphere of economic activity in Hong Kong.92 Politicization nevertheless
seldom meaningfully extends beyond the road and rail segments of the
sector. The air and water components, which impinge less decisively on
the daily living of the grassroots community, have been subject to
relatively modest bottom-up influences. The government has thus been
able to proceed in a comparatively autonomous fashion and employ a
predominantly managerial, as distinct from a political, which involves
complex balancing, compromises, and tradeoffs, style. Decisions relating to
strategic aviation issues cannot be described as merely the product ofextemally-constrained, where appropriate-technical deliberations, sound
or otherwise. They are imbued with political undertones, yet ones more
consonant with the private interest and institutional theoretical perspectives.
Hong Kong has been portrayed, favorably for the most part, as a
minimalist "State".9 3 This expression conjures up images of a detached
Weberian-style bureaucracy mechanically performing a handful of
Smithian-type functions absolutely essential to the smooth operations of
the private market. Indeed, it was none other than Friedman, the founding
father of modem monetarism and a prominent exponent of the Chicago
School of economics, who has depicted the territory as the last bastion of
the laissez-faire intellectual tradition and sympathetically likened it to a
night-watchman State:
Hong Kong has no tariffs or other restraints on international trade.... It has no
government direction of economic activity, no minimum wage laws, no fixing of
prices.... Government plays an important, [but limited, role].... It enforces
law and order, provides a means for formulating the rules of conduct, adjudicates
disputes, facilitates 94transportation and communication, and supervises the
issuance of currency.

Policy realities have never conformed fully to this stylized textbook
portrait and the divergence has grown more pronounced over time, although
not to a point rendering the portrait completely obsolete. The minimalist
State has proved itself capable of succumbing to interventionist

92. For an overview, see Rebecca Kwok, Transport Policy, in THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION INITS FIRST DECADE 729, 729-62 (Joseph Y. S. Cheng
ed., 2007).
93. See MA NGOK, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG: STATE, POLITICAL
SOCIETY AND CIVIL SOCIETY

94.

17-21 (2007).

MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT 33-34(1981). See also G.B. ENDACOrT, A HISTORY OF HONG KONG (1964);
ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE CHANGING FACE OF HONG KONG: NEW DEPARTURES IN PUBLIC
POLICY (1973); ALVIN RABUSHKA, VALUE FOR MONEY: THE HONG KONG BUDGETARY
PROCESS (1976); ALVIN RABUSHKA, HONG KONG: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC FREEDOM
(1979); BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, DAVID NEWMAN & ALVIN RABUSHKA,
FORECASTING POLITICAL EVENTS: THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG (1985); BRUCE BUENO DE
MESQUITA, DAVID NEWMAN & ALVIN RABUSHKA, RED FLAG OVER HONG KONG (1996).
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impulses and being drawn into the socio-political cauldron. 95 Moreover,
its responses have not invariably followed a "neutral" path. The cultivated
sense of bureaucratic detachment has always been something of an
illusion as the administrative elite has chosen to ally itself closely with
its business counterpart throughout the colonial era and beyond. This
pattern has been carefully and credibly documented by Goodstadt, an
astute observer of the Hong Kong politico-economic scene and a
strategically-positioned government insider, former Head of the Central
Policy Unit.96 The picture he has painted suggests that the minimalist
State has consistently displayed strong corporatist tendencies.9 7
The decisive and wholesale liberalization of the telecommunications
sector is often cited as an example of bureaucratic distance from
business and willingness to undertake structural reforms costly for
entrenched corporate interests. As a consequence of this strategic
initiative, a distinctly monopolistic configuration has given way to an
unambiguously fragmented one. Consumers have reaped the benefits in
terms of product diversity, price, and quality. Such examples however
are few and far between. In some key industries, the minimalist State
has been content to countenance, and even encourage, a high concentration
of market power and uncompetitive practices. 98 Moreover, the circumstances
which precipitated the revamping were somewhat unique from a
political perspective99 and the status quo was becoming technologically
untenableO° The persistent reluctance to contemplate ,until recently, a
95. See MA, supra note 93, at 21-31. See also T.Y. CHENG, THE ECONOMY OF
HONG KONG (1982); A.J. YOUNGSON, HONG KONG: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLICY
(1982); GAVIN PEEBLES, HONG KONG'S ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY MACROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1988); MANAGING THE NEW HONG KONG ECONOMY 1-17 (David Mole ed.,
1996); Edward K.Y. Chen, The Economic Setting, in THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN

3-46 (David G. Lethbridge & Ng Sek Hong eds., 4th ed, 2000).
See LEO F. GOODSTADT, UNEASY PARTNERS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PUBLIC
INTEREST AND PRIVATE PROFIT IN HONG KONG (2005). See also Mole, Introduction, in
MANAGING THE NEW HONG KONG ECONOMY, supra note 95.
97. See sources cited supra note 96.
98. See GOODSTADT, supra note 96, at 4-5, 67-80, 117-138; Mushkat & Mushkat,
HONG KONG

96.

supra note 1.

See GOODSTADT, supra note 96, at 4-5, 67-68.
For an overview, see MILTON MUELLER, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
HONG KONG: THE CASE FOR LIBERALIZATION (2d ed. 1992); TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN
THE ASIA PACIFIC BASIN: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (Eli Noam, Seisuke
Komatsuzaki & Douglas A. Conn eds., 1994); TELECOMMUNICATIONS INASIA: POLICY,
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT (John Ure ed., 1995); Xu Yan & Douglas C. Pitt, One
Country, Two Systems: ContrastingApproaches to TelecommunicationsDeregulationin
Hong Kong China, 23 TELECOMM. POL'Y 245, 245-60 (1999); DEREGULATION AND
99.
100.

modem-style competition law is indicative of an enduring determination
to preserve a modicum of big business privileges.10'
Trends in the aviation domain have not materially deviated from this
pattern. The colonial regime had exhibited an unmistakable bias in favor
of British Airways (BA), perhaps under subtle pressure from London,
and it had otherwise been gently protective of the home carrier
(Cathay Pacific).' 0 2 It is apparent that its post-1997 counterpart has gone 10to3
considerable lengths not to erode the latter's margin of advantage.
This may not amount to a full-scale, Chicago-type capture, and the
strategy may even include an element of the public interest, however
defined. Yet, it is a reflection of a deliberate corporatist orientation,
which has deep historical roots and manifests itself in a number of
pivotal spheres of economic activity. A unilateral opening of Hong
Kong's skies and parallel initiatives could prove highly disruptive for the
generally profitable and stable home carrier, far more so than for the
hub, from a long-term perspective. That doubtlessly is an additional
factor in the complex regulatory equation.
A host of institutional influences may also impinge on decisions relating
to the open skies platform, some possibly in a meaningful fashion. It
should thus be noted that a minimalist State is not necessarily a
reformist one. An innate conservatism, coupled with a strong penchant
for not tinkering with time-honored simple rules governing organizational
behavior, tends to breed a degree of strategic inertia. The powerful
deregulation tide in the latter part of the twentieth century had its origins
in maximalist settings (e.g., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United
Kingdom, and the United States) even though it was triggered by forces
selectively driven by minimalist values. The Hong Kong bureaucracy
has been traditionally content to adopt a passive posture and respond to
impulses emanating from other segments of the politico-economic and
INTERDEPENDENCE INTHE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION (Takatoshi Ito & Anne 0. Krueger eds.,
2000); TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA (John Ure ed., 2008).
101. See GOODSTADT, supra note 96, at 4-5; John H. Ho, From Free Port to
Competition: Is Asia's World City Playing Catch-up?, in THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION IN ITS FIRST DECADE 421-42, supra note 92 ; LEONARD K.
CHENG & CHANGQI WU, COMPETITION POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF BUSINESS (1998);

Edward K.Y. Chen & Ping Lin, Competition Policy under Laissez-Faireism: Market
Power and its Treatment in Hong Kong, 21 REv. OF INDUS. ORG. 145, 145-66 (2002);
Suk-Ching Ho & Chi-Fai Chan, In Search of a Competition Policy in a Competitive
Economy: The Case of Hong Kong, 37 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 68-85 (2003); TONY
LATTER, HANDS ON OR HANDS OFF? THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN

HONG KONG 91-100 (2007).
102. See GOODSTADT, supra note 96, at 68-69.
103.

See Law & Yeung, supra note 51.

For additional insights, see NG SEK HONG

& CAROLYN Y.W. POON, BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING IN HONG KONG: STRENGTHS AND
LIMITS OF POST-INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 49-76 (2004).

424

[VOL. 10: 381, 2009]

Open Skies
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

socio-political arenas, predominantly relying on outside rather than
inside initiation. 104
Moreover, its receptivity to external signals, a concept featuring in
regulatory theory, may be portrayed as limited. The governmental
decision-making machinery is supported by an extensive network of
advisory committees with substantial scope for private sector participation,
but not leadership. In addition, independent consultants are employed in
order to provide strategic or tactical illuminations. The selection process
however is closely controlled by the bureaucracy and so is the working
agenda, particularly at the strategic level.10 5 The Hong Kong Center for
Economic Research, a libertarian organization drawing its intellectual
inspiration from Chicago sources, has been issuing analytical reports
advocating radical liberalization across wide swathes of industrial
activity, including air transportation which do not overlook the open
skies issue. 10 6 However, these reports have seldom provoked a serious
official reaction, and that cannot be attributed just to the overly academic
packaging.
Another institutional factor which may be relevant in this context is
regulatory goal deflection stemming from organization-specific structural
influences, with functional ramifications, rather than economic pressures
(i.e., cartelization, capture, and individual versus collective utilitymaximization). In Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, particularly the United States,
lawyers often constitute the key professional element in regulatory
agencies. By virtue of their training and experience, and consequently
values and priorities set, they tend to place greater emphasis on processfocused objectives than outcome-oriented ones.107 Goal deflection is the
upshot. A similar phenomenon may be observed in Hong Kong, where
generalists, referred to as administrative officers, dominate the top layers
of the bureaucratic pyramid. They display lawyer-like qualities and, for
better or for worse, their modus operandi may slow the wheels of the
104. See Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Loose
Regulation: Modernity Meets Tradition in Hong Kong, 7 INT'L J. OF REG. &
GOVERNANCE 101, 101-46 (2007).
105. For an overview, see MA, supra note 93; JOHN P. BURNS, GOVERNMENT
CAPACITY AND THE HONG KONG CIVIL SERVICE (2004); IAN SCOTT, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG: REGIME CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC
SECTOR (2005); CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG POLITICS: GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-1997
ERA (Lam Wai-man et al. eds., 2007).

106.

See KWONG, supra note 51.

107.

See Roger G. Noll, Introduction, in
supra note 62, at 28-33.
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regulatory engine. 0 8 Interestingly, in "Communist" China too, generalists
have traditionally dictated policy direction, with technocrats gaining
ascendancy when decisive problem management has been required.' 09
It may be further argued that the post-1997 institutional environment
is not conducive to regulatory innovation, particularly in policy domains
involving relations with foreign jurisdictions. The transition from British to
Chinese rule may have not been abrupt, but the local bureaucracy,
apparently somewhat inward-looking and static in its attitudinal disposition,
may have not been sufficiently prepared and adequately equipped to
effectively confront the external challenges likely to emerge within the
politically more complex "One Country, Two Systems," or "Greater
China, organizational framework. The gap between strategic expectations
embedded in the new reality, or the sheer magnitude of the task facing
the post-1997 policy makers, and institutional capabilities may have
induced a degree of caution, or a systematic preference for risk avoidance
rather than risk taking."" 0 The lack of strategic predictability and
transparency on the Chinese side 1 may have compounded
the uncertainty
2
and may have reinforced the conservative bias."
This theme has been brought into sharp focus by one of Hong Kong's
leading political scientists. In a series of trenchant studies, he has
highlighted the growing institutional convergence between the territory
and China.'13 Other researchers have focused on the increasing economic
integration, particularly in the Pearl River Delta context, and the positive
spillovers accruing to the two parties, without suggesting that a marked
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(as distinct from modest) erosion of autonomy has taken place, thus
leaving the local organizational fagade largely intact. By contrast, Lo has
likened the whole process to one of mainlandization and recolonization.
According to him, Hong Kong has become economically dependent on
China and deferential toward the central government in key spheres of
socio-political activity. This has inevitably affected its institutional
landscape, both structurally and functionally. 1 4 One does not need to
assume that the thesis is fully valid to conclude that regulatory innovation
in an area impinging on mainland interests, including those of its
budding airlines, and having global or regional ramifications, would be
perceived as a risky enterprise by local policy makers.
This trend, whether firmly grounded in organizational reality or somewhat
overstated, may have implications for strategic initiatives falling short of
complete liberalization. There is some scope, for example, for enhancing
Asian cooperation without direct American participation. This reflects
the fact that the bilateral accords between countries in the region and the
United States are generally more progressive than those among
themselves. The reluctance to liberalize them even further by granting,
for instance, unlimited Seventh Freedom rights or change of gauge rights
to American carriers apparently stems from the belief that this might
pave the way for their domination of Asian aviation markets. In such
circumstances, it would be logical for countries in the region, particularly
those enjoying substantial locational advantages, to solidify mutual
commercial relationships and forge more progressive agreements. This
could boost the competitiveness of Asian airlines. 115 Hong Kong might
be expected, in a low-key fashion if necessary, to take the first steps in
that direction but, rather typically from a post-1997 perspective," 1 has
thus far refrained from pursuing the less ambitious regional cooperation
option.
Cross-border institutional convergence, whose degree cannot be
reliably ascertained, has coincided with additional cohesion-sapping
developments in the political environment in which the regulatory
machinery is embedded. Progress has nevertheless been transformed as
the legislature, fledgling parties, pressure groups, and civil societyincluding the vociferous media-have gained greater prominence, which
114. See sources cited supra note 113.
115. See Law & Yeung, supra note 51.
116. See Mushkat, Hong Kong's Exercise of External Autonomy: A Multi-Faceted
Appraisal,supra note 33.

should not be necessarily equated with tangible influence. Executive-led
government remains entrenched, yet in a political setting characterized
by growing checks and balances, and where the exercise of executive
power has evolved into a far more challenging undertaking than in the
heyday of the colonial era.11 7 This has been accompanied by increasing
institutional fragmentation. Indeed, it has been noted that the political
system has become "disarticulated". Specifically, given that the entire
structure amounts to "neither parliamentary fish nor presidential fowl,
the executive, the bureaucracy and the legislature (which is divided
within itself) each pursue their own agendas, punctuated by occasional
skirmishes on the boundaries of their' 1 domains
and by subterranean
8
campaigns to extend their jurisdictions."
The colonial era had witnessed at least three "crises of legitimacy",
although their degree is equally difficult to reliably ascertain. However,
they proved relatively short-lived and containing them had not posed a
formidable problem. 119 The crisis of legitimacy stemming from the
transition from British to Chinese rule has been more prolonged and less
amenable to strategies of containment. Government performance has
also deteriorated during the post-1997 period and Chinese actions have
at times undermined local confidence.'12 ( This has resulted in a persistent
erosion of trust in the policy machinery, reinforcing the adverse effects
of institutional fragmentation.12 ' In such a fragile organizational setting,
regulatory quantum leaps in general, other than in special local circumstances,
and with respect to the open skies platform in particular may be well
beyond the realm of feasibility. Influences of this nature ought arguably
to be taken into consideration when dissecting the global legal
architecture.
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V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

The fact versus value controversy is a tip of the slippery analytical
iceberg. Underlying it are intense disagreements between members of
different schools of thought (e.g., objectivists and subjectivists, realists
and constructivists) as to what qualifies as true or false and good or evil.
Neither the law nor the social sciences can avoid this intellectually
treacherous territory-indeed, it would be inappropriate for researchers
operating in those academic domains to bypass that uncomfortable
terrain in a cavalier fashion. For practical purposes, it may nevertheless
be convenient, or even legitimate, to assume that the two intertwined
concepts can be clinically uncoupled in order to exclusively focus on one
or the other. This Article is thus not without sympathy for the libertarian
vision from which Hong Kong is assumed to draw its inspiration (albeit
not unambiguously) but its principal purpose is to provide an empiricallybased explanation rather than engage in strict normative evaluation.
Factually-driven analytical accounts may not be the mainstay of
traditional legal scholarship and the "hard" social sciences, yet they can
scarcely be portrayed as a peripheral phenomenon. The picture varies
from one academic sub-discipline to another, but such accounts feature
prominently in the fields of contemporary international law and
international political economy, to the extent that international law and
international relations overlap, the latter has long displayed a strong
empirical and analytical orientation. Rather than treating this explanatory
survey as a stand-alone case study, it may thus be desirable to place the
findings in a broader theoretical context. The open skies platform, while
loosely structured, has the attributes of a legal regime or intemational legal
regime,122 a factually-grounded analytical construct. The corollary is
that the Hong Kong experience in that respect may furnish additional
insights into a concept whose empirical roots do not materially extend
beyond American and European territory.
Its loose structure notwithstanding, the open skies platform occupies a
relatively high place in the hierarchy of international regimes. It is a
diverse platform with weak multilateral underpinnings. Some of its
components have not evolved beyond the constellation that prevailed

122. A regime is a set of "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given [issue-area]."
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).

prior to the partial deregulation of the international aviation industry and
others have by no means seen exponential progress. Yet, it is a formal
legal platform governed by explicit sovereign, or equivalent, commitments,
even if predominantly bilateral in nature. It does not just substantively
differ from regimes which are anchored in implicit undertakings, often
possessing significant practical ramifications, but can be said to be
technically "superior" (without necessarily being "better") to them. The
implication is that Hong Kong's adaptation to this moving platform may
shed further theoretical light on the functioning of international legal
regimes rather than merely forms of patterned interstate behavior, which
in itself
should not be automatically equated with customary international
12 3
law.

Such formal systems and their informal counterparts are multidimensional
entities. Legal researchers and social scientists have principally focused
on two facets: regime origins and persistence. Their ideas have followed
three theoretically divergent paths: realist/neorealist, liberal/neoliberal,
and cognitivist. They do however loosely share at least one common
crucial assumption: their work is based on the fundamental premise that
international regimes are an essentially effective antidote to international
anarchy. The analytical gap between the realist and liberal conceptual
schemes is less wide than that separating them and the cognitivist
edifice, the latter is an academically well established school of thought,
and it would thus be inappropriate to portray it as nonmainstream, but it
is of a relatively recent vintage and its policy impact has been distinctly
more modest.
State power looms large in realist discourse and, importantly in this
context, so do its unequal distribution and ramifications thereof for
system performance. International regimes are thought to be dominated
by a single hegemon who acts as a stabilizing force by displaying
specific commitments and deploying relevant capabilities. The resulting
configuration remains intact, hence hegemonic stability, even in the face
of selective free riding by other participants-as long as there are no
marked shifts in the distribution of State power and the hegemon does
not retreat into indifference or negativism.
Realist-style regimes may
123. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 23-26 (2005).
124. For an overview, see Stephen D. Krasner, State Power and the Structure of
International Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317, 317-47 (1976); ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND

CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS
(1981); Charles P. Kindleberger, Dominance and
Leadership in the InternationalEconomy: Exploitation,Public Goods, and Free Rides,
25 INT'L STUD. Q. 242, 242-52 (1981); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN
DEPRESSION, 1929-1939 (2d ed. 1986); Michael C. Webb & Stephen D. Krasner,
Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment, 15 REV. OF INT'L STUD. 183,
183-98 (1989).
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encompass a wide range of patterned interstate behavior, exhibiting
characteristics which are accorded considerable attention in contemporary
theories of international law,25such as coincidence of interest, coordination,
cooperation, and coercion.1
A noteworthy feature of the realist conception is the assumption that
States are highly sensitive to relative gains or losses. Specifically, they
go to great lengths to insure that, subject to any meaningful constraints
stemming from disparities in State capabilities to affect outcomes, other
parties do not obtain more from an agreement than they do. Cooperation
is thus more likely to materialize in situations where a broadly equitable
course can be readily followed. In practice, this is typically the case in
the economic domain, because pursuing rough symmetry may not be a
practical option in the military realm, given the prevalence of hegemonic
limitations, irrespective of whether the hegemon is "benevolent" or
"malevolent", although this is obviously a relevant factor.1 26 However,
even in the economic sphere, State power may be a key determinant of
the actual shape of the bilateral or multilateral accord.'2 7
In terms of behavioral range, liberals cast their analytical net less wide
than realists. As befitting the intellectual successors to idealists, they
primarily focus on cooperation, which they distinguish from harmony
and discord. 128 Collaborative interaction is rooted in State interdependence
rather than State dominance. The presence of a hegemon is not a
necessary condition for regime formation and persistence. Power is not
a decisive element in the overall equation. It neither definitively shapes
State preferences nor exclusively determines regime evolution. Even if
they do not conform to the supposedly stability-enhancing unipolar
pattern, international regimes generate concrete benefits for members

125.

See GOLDSMITH& POSNER, supra note 123, at 10-14, 27-35, 84-91.

126.

For an overview, see Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of

Cooperation:A Realist Critique and the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,42 INT'L ORG.
485, 485-507 (1988); JOSEPH M. GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE,
AMERICA, AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE (1990); Joseph M. Grieco et al., The
Relative-Gains Problemfor InternationalCooperation,87 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 729, 72935 (1993); Joseph M. Grieco, Understandingthe Problem of InternationalCooperation:
the Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory, in
NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 301, 301-39 (David A.
Baldwin ed., 1993).

127. See Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and NationalPower: Life on
the ParetoFrontier,43 WORLD POL. 336, 336-66 (1991).
128. For an overview, see ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION
AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).

(e.g., they crystallize expectations regarding interstate behavior, lower
transaction costs, furnish valuable information with respect to actions of
other participants, reduce uncertainty,
and solidify external linkages),
129
thus fostering a cooperative spirit.
Liberals express misgivings about the modeling of international reality
along the lines of the classic single-round, two-person prisoner's dilemma
game, in which the payoff structure renders defection a dominant
strategy for both players, arguing that realists implicitly follow this
methodological path. According to them, behavioral responses in oneoff situations should not serve as a basis for drawing inferences concerning
interstate relations, which need to be sustained over long periods of time.
The iterated prisoner's dilemma game is a more effective analytical tool
for explaining sequential decision making under uncertainty in dynamic
international settings. In such circumstances, it is rational for States to
cooperate in the present in order to prevent other States from defecting
in the future (i.e., pursue a tit-for-tat strategy) and to
focus on absolute1 30
as distinct from relative-gains from collaboration.
The State is the principal focus of theoretical attention in both realist
and liberal accounts of international regime development, although the
latter offers greater scope for incorporating non-State actors into the
conceptual framework. While they are not always made unambiguously
explicit, State goals obviously diverge rather than converge in realist and
liberal explanatory schemes. At the same time, the State is viewed from
the two perspectives not merely as an autonomous, purposeful, and
unitary entity but also as an entirely rational one. This is consistent with
contemporary international legal theories which obtain their inspiration
from microeconomics, without unequivocally embracing methodological
individualism. Such theories posit that, like corporations, States may be
regarded as agents with a clear identity, cohesive
structure, well-defined
31
preferences and instrumental orientation.'
Several branches of the law have an increasingly productive conceptual
relationship with economics, albeit a largely one-sided in nature.
International legal theory, even of a contemporary vintage, continues to
veer more strongly toward other behavioral sciences such as political
sociology. The prominent New Haven-Yale school of international law
thus places a heavy emphasis on social choice processes relied upon in
pursuing community well-being, jurisprudential goals. In recent years,
129.
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its exponents have resolutely challenged the State-focused, nationalist
model embraced by economically-minded legal researchers (i.e., the
assumption that 'international law emerges from States' pursuit of selfcentered policies on the international stage"). 132 They have consistently3
painted a highly pluralistic picture of the global legal landscape'
featuring a host of significant non-State actors 34and powerful bottom-up,
as distinct from top-down, State-driven forces.'
Cognitivism, a variant or an extension of constructivism, which posits
that, although a real world exists, it does not possess an inherent meaning,
has sociological underpinnings too, albeit ones of the micro rather than
macro variety, social-psychology versus political sociology. Its conception
of international regimes reflects the belief that agents or States engage in
action in a social as well as a material setting and that this setting
provides them with an understanding of their interests. The corollary is
that agents or States are not necessarily rational players, that they cannot
be isolated in a positivist fashion from their socio-political environment
for analytical purposes, that perceptions of interest and power matter,
that such perceptions are not static, that different constructions of interest
and power are a common phenomenon, and that iteration-both in
game-like situations and the real world-is accompanied by learning
the future but draw
(i.e., that agents or States do not merely discount
135
lessons from the past and respond accordingly).
Subjectivity, or inter-subjectivity, is thus a key component of cognitivist
regime theories. The emphasis is on the acquisition of contextual and
differential meaning via the performance of roles in complex and
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dynamic social settings. The ideas that crystallize in such circumstances
exert a strong influence on agents' or States' behavioral trajectories and,
by implication, regime evolution, as shown in Table 4. It follows that
idea formation, selection, dissemination, and implementation are crucial
processes that ought to loom large on the international law/relations
research agenda, hence the focus on epistemic communities which
generate, prioritize, share, and promote policy ideas. Regimes also shape
agents' or States' perceptions of international reality, including their
own derived identities, and provide them with cues regarding acceptable,
desirable, or legitimate modes of international conduct (i.e., they have
constitutive, as well as regulative, effects).' 3 6
TABLE 4
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

CENTRAL VARIABLE

METATHEORETICAL
ORIENTATION
BEHAVIORAL
MODEL
INSTITUTIONALISM

REALISM

LIBERALISM

COGNITIVISM

Power
Rationalist

Interests
Rationalist

Knowledge
Sociological

Relative
gains
seeker

Absolute gains Role player
maximizer

Weak

Medium

Strong

Adapted from Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, op.cit., p. 6.
A number of potentially useful observations may be offered with
respect to the three competing conceptual schemes, as well as related
theoretical constructs, outlined above in light of Hong Kong's open skies
experience. First, no single analytical framework may claim universal
validity; their relevance apparently varies from one issue-area to another
and one set of structural conditions to another (i.e., achieving situational
validity may be a less ambitious, but more appropriate, objective for
their proponents); as matters stand, attempts to design an overarching
conceptual scheme may prove unproductive, particularly since the scope
for systematically integrating individual international regime theories
seems limited.'37 Second, even if taken together and augmented by
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incorporating complementary mainstream perspectives, the three analytical

frameworks do not provide a sufficiently comprehensive foundation for
exploring patterned interstate behavior; domestically-oriented, and thus
non-mainstream from a broader viewpoint conceptual schemes focused
on the regulatory function may shed further light on the functioning of
international legal regimes such as the open skies platform. Third,
theory construction must not be exclusively based on samples or case
studies heavily skewed toward the United States or Europe and the analytical
effort should be extended across the entire geographic spectrum; the
inclusion of cases not readily conforming to the "dominant" politicoeconomic and socio-political model may turn out to be an especially
beneficial step.
Interestingly, the realist school, the oldest and least fashionable of the
three, paints a picture most consistent with the specific empirical trends
identified in this paper. The open skies regime has displayed hegemonic
characteristics throughout most of its history and its relatively high

degree of stability may be legitimately attributed to hegemonic influences.
By the same token, the principle of reciprocity, envisioning relative
rather than absolute agent or State gains, lies at the heart of the system,
both in the normative and practical sense of the term. As an economically
active, but politically marginal, member of the regime, Hong Kong has
opted for a strategy of opportunistic adaptation, largely following an
exogenously charted course whose features have been more or less
determined in hegemonic headquarters. Unlike in many other similar
domains (e.g., trade in goods and most services, foreign investment), the
territory has not sought absolute gains, which could have conceivably
resulted in the long run from unilateral opening of its skies, and has
consistently, even rigidly, adhered to the relativist formula.
The State has clearly played a pivotal role in the process. This again
conforms to realist portrayals of international regime dynamics, without
diverging from liberal and economically-inspired nationalist, in contemporary
international law, ones. Subject to the qualification that the adjective
has no precise empirical meaning, and taking prevailing domestic and
external constraints into consideration, there is no reason to suggest that
State actions have been not predominantly rational on the open skies
front. Once more, this is not at variance with realist, as well as liberal

Richards, Toward a Positive Theory of InternationalInstitutions: Regulating International
Aviation Markets, 53 INT'L ORG. 1, 1-37 (1999).

and economically-inspired nationalist, predictions. Elsewhere, notably
in American hegemonic territory, there may have been strong pluraliststyle bottom-up forces at work, although as a whole the open skies
regime seems to be characterized by a relatively low degree of institutional
fragmentation. Yet, this has not been the case in Hong Kong, and
presumably in many other jurisdictions, Singapore being an obvious
example.
That said, the realist model does not fit the empirical facts in all
respects. The open skies regime has matured considerably and no longer
depends critically on a single hegemon for its survival. From a structural
perspective, it currently resembles a loose duopoly, with the European
community serving as an economic counterweight to the United States.
Liberal-type conceptions of cooperation, possibly reinforced by some
cognitivist influences, may be contributing to its persistence, indeed,
steady quantitative and qualitative expansion. Within this institutional
framework, Hong Kong enjoys a growing room for maneuver, particularly
if China is removed from the equation for analytical purposes, and, in
terms of policy content, has forged moderately diversified commercial
relations with a substantial number of "partners" across the globe. A
higher degree of diversity could have been achieved, had it not been for
a self-imposed strategic restraint.
Moreover, the pivotal role played by the State should not be equated
with an exclusive one. The unitary realist construct does not accord
even with the mildly differentiated Hong Kong institutional landscape,
let alone with genuinely pluralist ones. The same obviously holds true
for its liberal and economically-inspired/nationalist counterparts. The
territory's political system may be executive led, but it is not rigidly topdown driven. As pointed out, a close partnership between government
and business has been a key hallmark of the local institutional
environment since the inception of the colonial era to the present. Like
the current open skies regime, the overall pattern is structurally similar
to a market duopoly. The concept of State interest, supposedly pursued
in a determined fashion by political agents, is thus distinctly ambiguous.
The issue of "whose interest" is being sought can not be conveniently
overlooked, other than for purposes of conducting controlled analytical
experiments. This is selectively acknowledged in the liberal and economicallyinspired nationalist literature but not explored as thoroughly as in
domestically-oriented writings on regulatory behavior.
On the face of it, cognitivism appears to be the product of theoretical
over-specification: too many esoteric variables substantially imported
from developmental psychology are potentially brought to bear with
excessive precision on a problem involving an essentially businesslike
government which grapples with concrete challenges in a seemingly
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practical manner. This school of thought however is not irrelevant in
this context. Ideas, as distinct from power and interests, have clearly
been a key factor in shaping the evolution of the open skies regime,
particularly at decisive turning points. Whether or not they can be
meaningfully decoupled from power and interests, ideas have considerable
explanatory value and merit close scholarly attention. To their credit,
cognitivists have approached this task methodically and have tentatively
identified social mechanisms facilitating idea formation, selection,
sharing, and promotion. With reference to Hong Kong, the question
relates to the impediments to the flow of locally well-entrenched
liberatarian ideas pertaining to the open skies platform. As argued here,
the answer partly lies in the institutional domain, although cognitivist-style
probing may yield additional insights.
According to liberals and cognitivists, institutions matter. The former
neatly reconcile this posture with the notion of State-focused utility
maximization, the latter discard it unambiguously. Both schools of thought
offer accounts of regime development which are heavily tilted toward
the international institutional component. The domestic scene is largely
relegated to the analytical periphery. Yet, the Hong Kong open skies
experience suggests that, on balance, domestic institutional factors outweigh
international ones in such circumstances. The territory's low-risk strategy
on this front is mostly the product of domestic influences-the China
element being the sole notable exception to the rule and, even in that
regard, internal and external effects may be viewed as two sides of the
same domestic coin. This configuration may well be typical of bilateral
legal regimes aimed at controlling private sector activity, which tend to
be strongly underpinned by domestic forces at the margin, where
explanatory efforts should be directed. The corollary arguably is that
domestically-oriented theories of regulation should be incorporated into
conceptual schemes centered on such regimes.
VI. CONCLUSION

Hong Kong's symbolic status as the last bastion of the laissez-faire
intellectual tradition may have undergone mild erosion since the heyday
of the colonial era, but it remains largely intact from a comparative
perspective. For the most part, the territory conducts its external economic
affairs in accordance with the neoclassical logic and exponents of the
Chicago school continue to extol its virtues, even if somewhat simplistically.
Immigration policies are a notable exception to the rule, yet this is a

strategic domain universally governed by altogether different principles,
indeed one where international law plays scarcely any meaningful role.
Aviation policies also selectively qualify as an outlier, at least with
respect to the open skies platform. In this sphere of externally-directed
economic activity, Hong Kong has generally proceeded cautiously and,
in terms of certain relevant criteria, has failed to live up to its libertarian
reputation. Theories of regulatory behavior may effectively account for
the gap between economically-grounded expectations and actual performance.
This specific empirical pattern is not without broader analytical
implications, particularly for international legal regimes. Such systems
have traditionally been explored from three conceptual perspectives,
some more mainstream than others: realist, liberal, and cognitivist.
Economically-inspired nationalist insights and those of the New Haven
school have also provided pertinent illumination. The Hong Kong open
skies experience suggests that none of these theoretical frameworks
holds sway in all circumstances. Nor are they sufficient in themselves,
whether individually or collectively, to furnish a wide-ranging basis for a
thorough understanding of international legal regime evolution. Analytical
contributions from additional sources, including domestically-oriented
ones, may be needed. Last but not least, theory construction and
empirical validation should not be narrowly confined to the political core
of the global system but be extended to its large and significant periphery.
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